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FOREWORD
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At the inception of The Ouerbein Miscellany in l%r), its 
board of advisors proposed to offer the publication once or twice 
a year, depending on the volume of manuscripts submitted and 
accepted. The publication was offered annually until 1978, when 
in that year submissions were not sufficient to warrant publica­
tion. Ifecause of the number of manuscripts available this year, 
however, we are offering a double issue of the Miscellany. At 
least two of the essays presented in this issue were submitted 
in 1978. We are therefore numbering this issue as Vols. XIV-XV, 
1978-1979.
A main theme of this issue, as Professor Paul Hcdditt sug­
gests in his introduction to the featured symposium on Robert M. 
Pirsig, is the illusive question of “creativity.” What is creativ­
ity, not only in education, but in all aspects of life? Pirsig’s 
book has the virtue of pulling this question down off the pedestal 
on which theoretical treatment has placed it and handling it more 
intimately, autobiographically.
Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is some­
thing of a surprising cultural phenomenon in the sense that it is 
essentially a philosophical work which has had wide popular 
appeal. Once we have suggested that readers seem to like the 
book, however, it is important to have some indication of what we 
wish to do with it in terms of establishing an active relationship 
with the philosophy it expresses. I he essays on Pirsig by 
members of the symposium are varying attempts to address this 
question.
One of the great scholars of our time, Paul Tillich, had a 
good deal to say about the nature of creativity. Put he continually 
underscored the notion that creativity goes hand in hand with the 
patience of work. Tillich offered a telling anecdote which illus­
trates this idea;
A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a picture 
of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said that it 
would take a long time. After a year the emperor reminded 
him of his promise. The painter replied that after a y(‘ar of 
studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive the sur­
face of its nature. After another year the artist asserted that 
he had just begun to penetrate the essence of this kind of 
life. And so on, year after year. Finally after ten years of 
concentration on the nature of the rooster, he painted the
111
picture — a work described as an inexhaustible revelation of 
the divine ground of the universe in one small part of it a 
rooster. *
Not all scholarly writing attains to the creative excellence of 
the Chinese painter’s rooster. We should remember, however that 
every catalogue of a library is crowded with the names of journals 
in which persons, patiently pursuing their work, have contributed 
to the store of human learning. Our main wish for The Olterbein 
Miscellany, now as always, is that it may be regarded as a 
vehicle for the expression of creative thought.
The editor owes a special debt of gratitude not only to the 
writers whose contributions are contained herein, but also to 
members of the skilled staff of the Otterbein Printing Department 
Mr. Forest Moreland, and Margie Shaw. ’
The Editor
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Paul L. Redditt
CREATIVITY AND THE QUEST FOR QUALITY:
A Symposium on Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values
The seminar for which the following papers were originally 
prepared was conceived from the desire of Otterbein’s team 
directing the Project for Institutional Renewal through the 
Improvement of Teaching (PIRIT) to address the subject of 
creativity. Creativity, in the sense of a holistic and appropriate 
response to the ambiguities of social and intellectual interaction 
in a complex environment, is one of the goals of liberal education. 
In our discussions of creativity, members of the PlRlT team have 
found it useful to conceive of creativity as a tension between 
structure and vitality. For teacher and student, structure includes 
such factors as belief systems, specific goals in presenting and 
acquiring information and skills, and a sense of security which 
sets limits to the intellectual and social risks an individual is 
willing to take. Vitality, on the other hand, includes such factors 
as a sense of play, an eagerness for new experience and insight, 
and a willingness to risk a degree of security in exchange for 
intellectual and social stimulation.
We believe that any attempt to foster creativity in ourselves 
as faculty members and in our students must take both of these 
factors into account and exploit the developmental potential 
which lies in the tension between them. An artist is profoundly 
aware of this tension: a painting or a poem must have a strong 
sense of structure, derived from the traditions in which it lies 
and in the nature of the materials from which it is made. It must 
also possess vitality: evidence of the artist’s new insights, his 
willingness to take risks. The successful painting or poem mani­
fests the tension between and the resolution of these two forces 
which, until the work appears, seem at odds with each other.
Similarly, both teachers and students need to take this tension 
into account in the learning process. Both need to work from a 
sense of structure: their concrete skill and information goals and 
their sense of security derived from past experience, their social 
relationships, their beliefs and values. On the other hand, the 
environment is constantly changing for both of them, and they 
need to learn to respond in terms of such creative attributes as 
sensitivity to problems, fluency, novelty of ideas, mental flexi­
bility, the ability to synthesize and analyze, to evaluate, to
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redefine and reorganize organized wholes, and so on. Thus open­
ness to change is set within a structure, and the successful 
learner can accept change and ambiguity without feeling himself 
unduly threatened.
In thinking about vitality straining at the restrictions of 
structure, the PIRIT team determined to look for someone who 
had in fact done or said something provocative, something fresh, 
something holistic, something appropo of the college context and 
the American scene in general. Robert M. Pirsig seemed to offer 
us what we were seeking. He wanted to take a fresh holistic 
approach to a society fractured into romantic versus technologi­
cal forces. This led him to examine the very foundation of 
Western thought and to offer what he thought was the solution to 
a millenia-long dichotomy in Western thinking. He wanted to take 
a fresh, holistic approach to teaching, an approach which he him­
self had hammered out during his tenure as a teacher of rhetoric. 
He offered a fresh look at insanity — both in terms of going 
insane, and in terms of coping with it. He even offered a fresh 
way of conceiving the assembling of a barbecue rotissere; i.e., 
approach the task with a deep composure as a sculptor ap­
proaches his work. None of us individually knew how successful 
Pirsig really had been in even putting the questions, but we 
suspected that in the collective expertise of our colleagues lay 
some perspective that might help us evaluate also the correct­
ness of Pirsig’s answers. But more importantly we suspected that 
the process of reading and reflecting on Pirsig would open us all 
up, bringing fresh insights, and indeed vitality, to our structured 
thought patterns. Pirsig may be right or wrong, but he does cause 
us to think.
2
Norman Cha,
* THE ^GE OE AQIIAIHES,
irsig s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenanct
ney
• j theme of modern philosophical thought, especially in
US existentialist mode, is that we live in an age of anxiLy. 
Modern man, so runs the familiar analysis, is an outsider: he 
su ers rom t e evil of “alienation.” We may characterize this 
nian who was once totally integrated (as in a 
primor la or mythical time) has become radically split in three 
main aspects. He is divided within himself, he is divided from 
o er men, an he is divided from his environment. His only hope 
or recovery (for those thinkers who hold out hope) is to find the 
way to a reintegration which will restore his unity with himself, 
IS community with his fellow men, and his companionability with 
an alien and hostile outer world.
ut what is the way to this reintegration? Does the way lie, 
or instance, through psychoanalysis, or through traditional 
re jgious faith? For Robert Pirsig, the author of Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance, neither of these proposed ways would 
suffice. For Pirsig, the way lies through the discovery of “zen,” 
a term he spends much of his book trying to explain. A main 
purpose^ of this essay is to grasp Pirsig’s explanation, and to 
place the book in an intellectual context. By means of such 
analysis, I wish to suggest an alternative for reckoning with the 
evil of alienation than the one Pirsig himself advocates.
Robert Pirsig was born in 1929. He holds a B.A. degree in 
philosophy and an M.A. degree in journalism from the University 
of Minnesota. In recent years he has earned his living primarily 
as a technical writer.
In the summer of 1968, Pirsig and his eleven-year-old son, 
Chris, mounted a 305 cc red Honda Superhawk and left their home 
town of St. Paul, Minnesora, for a two month motorcycle ride. 
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is largely an autobio­
graphical account of the trip. But the book is also a “chautau- 
qua, or a long intellectual monologue. A main purpose of the;
'•'Major portions of this essay appeared in the 1976 edition of The 
Ollerbein Miscellany under a different title. The essay appears here, in 
modified and expanded form, at the request of the PIRIT team.
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trip is to return to Bozeman, Montana, where in the late 50’s and 
early ’60’s, while teaching English at Montana State, Pirsig 
suffered a mental collapse that eventually hospitalized him for a 
series of shock treatments. Throughout the book Pirsig alludes 
to “Phaedrus” (a name appropriated from a Platonic dialogue). 
The reader does well to understand early in the book that 
Phaedrus is the name Pirsig attributes to the person he was 
before he underwent the shock therapy that blotted out his 
memory of the past. In returning to Bozeman, Pirsig is also 
attempting to recall his past and relate it to his present.
Pirsig is a thinker who stands in the mainstream of American 
Transcendentalism. Like Emerson before him, who is generally 
regarded as the chief spokesman of the American Transcenden- 
talist movement, Pirsig is a philosopher of the self conceived 
both as representative and as defined by its capacity for growth. 
He is a thinker dedicated to a new or ^*8^^ kind of “seeing,” 
ultimately to illumination or mystic vision ( zen ), a realization 
in experience, not in theory, of what Emerson referred to as the 
seer “becoming” what he sees.
But we must make a basic distinction between Emerson and 
Pirsig as philosophical thinkers. While Emerson was primarily 
concerned with the cultivation of innocent vision (a vision unin­
hibited by inquiry and analysis) as a means of regaining a child­
like appreciation of the oneness of the world with us and around 
us, Pirsig recognizes that inquiry and analysis are crucial to our 
existence, especially in an age in which we are compelled to 
think our way through the technomania of society. Pirsig, in 
other words, is an Emersonian of strongly rationalistic bent. 
ITiough he longs for the intellectual naivete' of the child, he 
recognizes the necessity for the intellectual maturity of the man. 
How to bring naivete' and maturity, intuition and judgment into 
confluence, how to have a childlike appreciation of the world and 
yet have a rationalistic understanding of the world — these are 
dichotomies with which Pirsig is concerned.
I propose not to rehearse the plot of the book so much as 
concentrate on its central philosophical ideas. (Much of the 
pleasure of the book lies in the reader’s tracing its plot-line.) 
And I perceive these to be at least threefold: (1) the idea of 
classical and romantic understanding; (2) the idea of Quality; 
and (3) the idea of zen. We will discuss each of these in turn.
Classical and romantic understanding. Pirsig assumes that 
there are at least two basic modes of human understanding:
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classical and romantic. He describes th 
following manner: ese two modes in the
A classical understanding sees the wnrl.) 
underlying form itself. A romantic understandinT^"^ 
primarily in terms of immediate appearance If ^ 
show an engine or a mechanical drawing or^°el T" •° 
schematic to a romantic it is unlikely he would1.1., I, ha. .o app.., haa.L. .L" a.,"'h^t 
IS Its surface. Dull, complex lists of names, lines and 
numbers. Nothing interesting. But if you were to show the 
same description to a classical person he might look at k 
and then become fascinated by it u ^ it
within the lines and shapes and symbols is a tremendous 
richness of underlying form.
The romantic mode is primarily inspirational, imagina­
tive. creative, intuitive. Feelings rather than facts predomi­
nate. Art when it is opposed to “Science” is often 
romantic. It does not proceed by reason or by laws. It pro­
ceeds by feeling, intuition and esthetic conscience'. In the 
northern European cultures the romantic mode is usually 
associated with femininity, but this is certainly not a 
necessary association. ^
The classic mode, by contrast, proceeds by reason and 
by laws - which are themselves underlying forms of thought 
and behavior. In the European cultures it is primarily a 
masculine mode and the fields of science, law and medicine 
are unattractive to women largely for this reason. Although 
motorcycle riding is romantic, motorcycle maintenance is 
purely classic. The dirt, the grease, the mastery of under­
lying form required all give it such a negative romantic 
appeal that women never go near it.^
Throughout the book Pirsig depicts certain characters as 
manifesting either a classical or romantic understanding of life. 
Pirsig’s “Phaedrus” self, for example, was almost exclusively 
classical in his understanding (a fact which contributed to his 
breakdown). The husband and wife, John and Sylvia Sutherland 
on the other hand, with whom Pirsig and his son make the motor­
cycle trip, are almost exclusively romantic in their understanding. 
Pirsig sees both the classical and romantic understandings as 
“valid ways of looking at the world.” Hut they are “irreconcil­
able with each other.”2 A main assumption of Pirsig’s is that 
authentic existence must be based on a mode of understanding 
that is neither strictly classical nor romantic, but that is inde­
pendent of the two. And he identifies this mode of understanding 
as “zen.” Let us delay our examination of Pirsig’s notion of 
zen,” however, until we have examined his notion of Quality.
The idea of Quality. In the book Pirsig touches upon two 
thousand years of epistemological theories: those offered by the
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Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and others. He is fasci­
nated by the subject-object distinction that runs through the 
history of Western philosophy. Inherent to this distinction is the 
question of whether value, or what Pirsig describes as “Quality,” 
exists merely in the mind (the subject) or whether it exists in the 
thing itself (the object). Pirsig approaches this question in the 
following manner:
Quality . . . you know what it is, yet you don’t know 
what it is. But that’s self-contradictory. But some things 
are better than others, that is, they have more quality. But 
when you try to say what the quality is, apart from the 
things that have it, it all goes poo/! There’s nothing to 
talk about. But if you can’t say what Quality is, how do you 
know what it is, or how do you know that it even exists? If 
no one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes it 
really doesn’t exist at all. But for all practical purposes it 
really does exist. What else are the grades based on? Why 
else would people pay fortunes for some things and throw 
others in the trash pile? Obviously some things are better 
than others . . . but what’s the “betterness”? ... So round 
and round you go, spinning mental wheels and nowhere 
finding anyplace to get traction. What the hell is Qualitv’
What is it?3
If Quality exists in the object, Pirsig maintains, “then you 
must explain just why scientific instruments are unable to detect 
it.” On the other hand, if Quality exists merely in the mind, 
then . . . Quality ... is just a fancy name for whatever you 
like.”4 Neither the answer that Quality exists in the object nor 
that it exists in the mind is satisfactory from Pirsig’s point of 
view. He describes the discovery he made, therefore, at the time 
he was Phaedrus, of where Quality does exist:
And really, the Quality he was talking about wasn’t 
classic Quality or romantic Quality. It was beyond both of 
them. And by God, it wasn’t subjective or objective either, 
it was beyond both of those categories. Actually this whole 
dilemma of subjectivity-objectivity, or mind-matter, with 
relationship to Quality was unfair. That mind-matter 
relationship has been an intellectual hang-up for centuries.
They were putting that hang-up on top of Quality to drag 
Quality down. How could he say whether Quality was mind 
or matter when there was no logical clarity as to what was 
mind and what was metter in the first place?
And so: he rejected the left horn. Quality is not objec­
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside in the material world.
Then: he rejected the right horn. Quality is not subjec­
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside merely in the mind.
And finally: Phaedrus, following a path that to his 
knowledge had never been taken before in the history of 
Western thought, went straight between the horns of the
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subje<'tivity-objectivity dilemma and said Quality is neither 
a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter. It is a third entity 
which is independent of the two.5
The acquiring of an understanding of Quality, Pirsig implies, 
depends upon the acquiring of a viewpoint for looking into the 
essence of things, a viewpoint which Pirsig identifies as “zen.”
The idea of zen. Pirsig makes no claim in his hook for being 
fully cognizant of “that great body of factual information relating 
to orthodox Zen Buddhist practiee.”*^ By whatever means of 
intuition and judgment, however, he seems to have attained a 
grasp of the Zen Buddhist notion that there is a mode of under­
standing which is an intuitive looking-into, in contradistinction 
to intellectual and logical understanding. Whatever else the term 
“zen” might mean, in the context of Zen and the Art of Motor­
cycle Maintenance, it means the unfolding of a worldview unper­
ceived in the confusion of a dualistic mind. When one is under 
the sway of the zen mode of understanding, the universe and man 
are one indissolvable existence, one total whole. Only Quality 
is. Anything and everything that appears as an individual entity 
or phenomenon (motorcycle or man), is but a temporary manifesta­
tion of Quality in form. Or as Pirsig expresses this idea in his 
own idiom again as he recalls a realization at the time he was 
Phaedrus:
‘‘The sun of quality . . . does not revolve around the 
subjects and objects of our existence. It does not just 
passively illuminate them. It is not subordinate to them in 
any way. It has created them. They are subordinate to it!
“Zen,” for Pirsig, in short, is a realization of the oneness of 
the world with us and around us. Philosophically speaking, he is 
a monist, or one who sees in the universe the manifestation or 
working of a single principle.
Insofar as Pirsig’s Zert and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
has won broad acclaim, he is seemingly a prime spokesman for a 
mode of philosophical monism which is in vogue in our time. Why 
should philoso phical monism be in vogue? We have suggested a 
possible answer to this question in the beginning of this essay. 
The fact that modern man experiences a sense of division within 
himself, from other people, and from his environment instills in 
him a yearning for a sense of being-at-home in the universe, a 
sense of companionship with the world in which he moves and 
has his being. This yearning for companionship may well be an 
attempt on the part of modern man to recapture the feeling of
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intimate belonging that presumably was characteristic of man in 
a pretechnological age.®
Of course, Pirsig as a thinker recognizes that modern man 
cannot return to a pretechnological age. Indeed, Pirsig himself is 
an advocate of technology (as symbolized by the motorcycle). But 
he also discerns that as modern man’s destiny interlocks with 
technology, he must sustain an apprehension (zen) of that deeper 
reality (Quality) which underlies and supports the quotidian 
reality of existence. Apart from such an apprehension, Pirsig’s 
book suggests, human life is bound to be a pretty lackluster 
affair.
But in spite of the merits of Pirsig’s book, at least three 
major difficulties confront us concerning its intellectual content. 
First, nowhere does a clear explanation of “Quality” present 
itself. If, as Pirsig suggests. Quality is the underlying principle 
which alone is the (ground of all things, then how can he maintain 
that some things are better in Quality than others? Why should he 
not maintain that all things are equal in Quality since all things 
are grounded in Quality? Apparently he holds to some notion of 
the gradation of Quality, which is not explained by his implied 
metaphysic.
Second, Pirsig’s positive attitude toward the world of entities 
does not positively and satisfyingly include persons. He tends to 
take other persons for granted (as is evident in the stoical 
posture he assumes in relation to the mental anguish of his son). 
Love and friendship among persons may be a concern for Pirsig, 
but it is not a primary concern. One feels that his interest in the 
world of men is muted.
The third problem that confronts us in the intellectual content 
of the book, however, requires more extensive analysis than the 
previous two. I have earlier suggested that religion as a formal 
mode of thought plays little part in Pirsig’s quest for authentic 
existence. Nevertheless, he shares a disposition with many 
religious seekers who express a “piety for the Age of Aquar­
ius.’’^ The essence of this piety can perhaps be approached 
through quotation of a passage by the American poet, Wallace 
Stevens:
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous.
Within its vital boundary, in the mind.
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Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
a w ich being there together is enough.
centra argument of these lines is similar to the one advanced 
y *^116 interest of self-authenticity. Through “imagina-
nation or meditation the self is encouraged to find its identity 
in t e central mind.” The culmination of this process is the 
oneself of an identity which transcends the 
1. “'®^*''^tion (‘‘God and the imagination are one”). The
rea ization of this identity, in Stevens’ view, is ‘‘A self that 
touches all edges.”11
But is Stevens’ purity of mind ‘‘enough” in one’s quest for 
authentic existence? Persons who think in these terms — includ- 
ing Pirsig — tend to have as their goal inner detachment. If one 
has a task to perform (working on one’s motorcycle) do it with 
detachment. If one must act, act dispassionately, for your true 
self is unaffected by anything that you do. Emerson says in his 
essay on Self-Reliance,” in a phrase that both Stevens and 
Pirsig would approve, that ‘‘Nothing can bring you peace but 
yourself.”! 2 When we place our center of balance outside us, 
Emerson maintained, we are not drawing upon the strengths that 
are inherent within us. Emerson’s outlook has a good deal in 
common with certain Eastern religions — such as Vedanta, 
Baha’i, and Zen Buddhism — as they are popularly expressed 
from within Western culture.13 But Western religions have 
traditionally opposed this outlook. Indeed, when Western religious 
thinkers encounter the Eastern outlook, as suggested for example 
in the work of Pirsig, they may well interpret it as a denial of 
God rather than an alternative way of conceiving God. I am not 
insisting that the Eastern outlook is useless for dealing with the 
technomania of society. My question is, however, whether in 
adopting the Eastern outlook we do not lose sight of a conception 
of the self that is powerfully and meaningfully at work in the 
Western outlook?
In Western religions, which have their root in Biblical tradi­
tion, the God with whom we have actively to deal is a God who 
acts. He is a God whose will we may seek, whose judgment we 
may accept, and whose promises afford us hope. The Biblical 
writers have persisted in the notion that man makes himself 
through his action, but he does not do so in isolation. He makes 
himself through interaction with other persons, and ultimately
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through interaction with God. A God who did not act, from the 
Biblical perspective, would be of no real significance in search 
for a meaningful self-identity, for God, in Kierkegaardian terms, 
is none other than the “Teacher.”1^ And the self is his agent in 
the world.
In the view of some persons, the Biblical notion of the self- 
God relationship is rankling, precisely because it seems lacking 
in empirical significance. Even so, it raises the possibility that 
inherent in all our dealing with the world there is an underlying 
responsibility of the self to the world.
Perhaps no recent religious thinker has developed the notion 
of the self’s responsibility to the world with greater clarity or 
consistency than H. Richard Niebuhr. His conception of the 
“responsible self’’^^ places the identity of the self within a 
network of relationships, but not in such a way to exclude 
relationship to the God of Biblical tradition. On the contrary, he 
insists that the self can be a unity, or attain authentic existence, 
amidst all the forces and events which act upon it, only if there 
is “One beyond the many”^*’ with whom the self can interact. If 
the self has its identity exclusively in relation to the multiplicity 
of forces and events with which it interacts, it is not one but 
many. Only as the self acknowledges in trust “that whatever 
acts upon me, in whatever domain of being, is part of, partici­
pates in, one ultimate action, then though I understand nothing 
else about the ultimate action, yet I am now one.’’17
Underl ying Niebuhr’s argument is a theory of gestalt. We tend 
to view actions upon the self in terms of some larger whole: a 
social group, a political process, the natural environment. If the 
context within which the self operates is narrow its capacity for 
action will be limited. The self will not feel a part of the scope 
of things, for example, if it understands itself strictly in terms of 
a religious sect. On the other hand, if the self sees itself in 
relation to One who acts in all things, it will have a quite 
different response. It will see those with whom it interacts as 
belonging to “one universal society which has its center neither 
in me nor in my finite cause, but in the Transcendent One,’’18 
the One beyond the many. And this seeing of the self as distinct 
from yet as interacting with the Transcendent One has the effect 
of drawing us not away from the world in detachment, but toward 
the world in passion, as the realm where God acts.
The quality of this passion toward the world has been aptly 
described by Kierkegaard in his characterization of the “knight
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of faith”:
He f'If ^ A * ‘ ' [^>^Iongs] entirely to finiteness
him'taU' ^ ^iight in everything, and whenever one sees 
^ Particular pleasure, he does it with the 
<;niil *which is the mark of the earthly man whose 
tU- ^ such things ... He takes delight in
' y *tig he sees, in the human swarm, in the new omni- 
uses, in the waters of the Sound; ... he is interested in 
everyt ing that goes on, in a rat which slips under the curb, 
in the children’s play. 19 *
In Kierkepard’s characterization, the “knight of faith” is “a 
man for whom the things of this world are profoundly interesting 
in themselves, whose mind the ‘truth of things’ is not engulfed 
an os in some higher reference, and whose search for an 
f discovery that elsewhere is essentially
ere. '■'sig, in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,
IS per aps in quest of a mode of existence that is similar to that 
o ler egaar s knight of faith, but his monistic vision disallows
the principle of the Transcendent One who is the Ground of the 
self.
In an age m which reputedly “God is dead,” it may seem 
credulous to assent to the notion of the Transcendent One who 
acts in, through, and with man in the world. Nevertheless, there 
IS a venerable tradition of piety in the history of Western thought 
- not taken into account by Pirsig - which insists that it is only 
on the basis of the principle of the I’ranscendent One that the 
self can assume a proper responsibility toward the world of 
thirigs. According to this tradition of piety, man lives ever on the 
borderland of something more than the self. Even if the self lives 
under an imperative of responsibility, it is not the overwhelming 
responsibility of lifting itself by its own bootstraps. “Thought is 
the hall-mark of man’s greatness.”21 But the tragedy of his 
thought is its brokenness. It may well be that man needs the 
conception of the Transcendent One to heal the brokenness.
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cott Company, 1967), p. 25.
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Margaret Hartman
VILLAINY: AN LXPOSR OF THE REAL VILLAIN
IN ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE
In this paper I wish to attack Pirsig and his account of Greek 
philosophy. I think he plays dirty , and the victims of his attack, 
Plato and Aristotle, are much too important and too worthy of 
respect to receive such shoddy treatment. Pirsig makes a number 
of inaccurate, undefended statements about the teachings of the 
Greek philosophers. Let me be clear: I have nothing against 
competent popularizers or innovative theorists; what I am against 
are popularizers who either do not know their subject matter or 
who recognize their interpretation is unusual but do not have the 
gumption to defend it. Indeed, I give his work too much credit by 
suggesting that it includes an interpretation of Plato and Aris­
totle. An interpretation is based on texts. Pirsig mentions some 
texts, but he seldom argues from the text, and what little he says 
in direct response to texts is usually errant. The passage in Zen 
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance which I find most offensive 
occurs on pages 352-353.1
Reason was to be subordinate, logically, to Quality, and he 
was sure he would find the cause of its not being so back 
among the ancient Greeks, whose mythos had endowed our 
culture with the tendency underlying all the evils of our 
technology, the tendency to do what is “reasonable” even 
when it isn’t any good. That was the root of the whole 
thing. Right there. I said a long time ago that he was in 
pursuit of the ghost of reason. This is what 1 meant. Reason 
and Quality had become separated and in conflict with each 
other and Quality had heen forced under and reason made 
supreme somewhaer back then.
I cannot imagine any circumstances under which either Plato or 
Aristotle would endorse doing what is reasonable even when it 
isn’t any good. Contrary to Pirsig’s contention Plato and Aris­
totle emphasize the interrelation of reason and quality; and when 
they indicate a superior partner in this relationship, both choose 
goodness (quality). Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of Greek 
thought.’’ (328)
Since I am not impressed with Pirsig’s account of Plato and 
Aristotle and since reading his account makes me furious, I 
intend to focus my attention in this paper on the works of Plato 
and Aristotle. My paper should provide adequate textual refer­
ences for the interested reader to delve into these texts more
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thoroughly. Then the reader will be in a position to make his or 
her own judgment about the adequacies of Pirsig’s scholarship. 
Since it is impossible to discuss all relevant material, I will 
limit my discussion to three texts: Plato’s Republic and Phile- 
bus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.^
The early dialogues work to establish a connection between 
reason and ethical behavior, but it is not until the Republic that 
Plato directly confronts the question of the relationship between 
reason and the Good. Plato presents his views through the 
character Socrates^ who explains that an exposition of the nature 
of the Good “seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my 
flight today’’ (Republic 506de). Rather than trying to describe the 
Good, Socrates presents three images which help illuminate its 
nature. All three of these images, the Sun, the Line, and the 
Cave, are attempts to impress upon us the existence of an intel­
ligible world which is distinct from and superior to the world 
grasped by the senses. The intelligible world is composed of 
Forms, eternal and unchanging objects which are apprehended by 
the mind without use of the senses. The Forms are also called 
Ideas, but they are not creations of the mind. Actions and objects 
in our everyday world depend on the forms for their existence: 
actions can only be just if they participate in the eternal unchang­
ing Form of Justice, and sensible chairs (chairs whose existence 
is grasped by the senses) can only exist if they participate in 
the eternal, unchanging Form of Chair. An eternal unchanging 
Form of Justice is generally more acceptable to common sense 
than an eternal unchanging form of Chair, but textual evidence 
strongly suggests that Plato’s theory of Forms attempts to pro­
vide stability for both ethics and physical reality.
7’his background information prepares the way for the Sun 
analogy, the image in the middle dialogues where Plato most 
explicitly articulates the relationship between the Good and 
reason.
This (the sun), then, you must understand that I meant by 
the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a 
proportion with itself. As the good is in the intelligible 
region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this (the 
sun) in the visible world to vision and the objects of 
visions. (Republic 508bc)4
In this passage Plato tells us that we can examine the role of 
the sun in the visible world in order to increase our understanding 
of the role of the Good in the intelligible world: thus, we can 
examine the relationship between the sun and vision in order to
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In The Visible World 
Sun
In The Intelligible World 
Good
Presence Absence Presence Absence
Sight has Sight has
clear vision dim vision
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR DIM
VISION VISION
Mind has clear Mind has dim 
apprehension apprehension 
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR DIM
APPREHENSION APPREHENSION
presence of the sun which produces clear vision, 
I 1* ** presence of the Good which produces clear intel­
lectual apprehension. It is true that scholars debate about the 
nature of this intellectual apprehension: some scholars maintain 
that It IS mysucal apprehension while others declare that it is 
knowled^ attained by reason. But however one chooses to trans­
late the Greek words involved, it remains clear that apprehension 
of the Good is the highest mental achievement. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the Good itself is superior to the mental power which 
apprehends it. At 509a Plato says:
But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration 
it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to 
think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider 
these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boni- 
form, but to think that either of them is the good is not 
right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and 
habit of the good.
In commenting on this passage Paul Shorey explains that Plato 
is not scrupulous in distinguishing good and the good.^ Nonethe­
less Plato’s lack of precision is not problematic because he 
maintains that anyone who apprehends the Good will also do the 
good. In any case, Glaucon responds to Socrates’ description 
exactly as if Socrates had said “Still higher honor belongs to the 
Form of the Good.’’ Such an interpretation of Plato’s statement 
accords well with the analogy to the sun. Just as the sun is 
superior to vision (the faculty which functions best in the 
presence of the sun), so too the good is superior to the mental 
function which performs cognition. Although Plato’s language is 
not as clear as it might be, the Sun analogy provides strong
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evidence suggesting that Plato did not subordinate the Good to 
rationality.
Reading the Sun analogy leaves one with little doubt that 
Plato considered the Good superior to the mental function which 
achieves knowledge and apprehension of the Good, but whatever 
doubt remains is quickly dispelled by Plato’s introduction to the 
Line, an image presented as a continuation of the Sun analogy. 
Plato effects the transition to the Line by saying;
Conceive then, as we were saying, that there are these two 
entities, and that one of them is soverign over the intel­
ligible order and region and the other over the world of the 
eye ball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You 
surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intel­
ligible. (Republic 509d)
Plato does not indicate the two identities to which he is referring 
in this passage, but the Sun analogy has already made it clear 
that the sun is the cause of things in the visible world and the 
Good is the cause of things in the intelligible world. In this 
passage Plato’s language emphasizes the superior role of these 
two entities; the sun is soverign over the visible world and the 
Good is soverign over the intelligible world. Surely then, the Sun 
and the Line imagery suggest that Pirsig is wrong when he says 
that Plato subordinates the Good to rationality.
I believe the material I have presented is adequate to show the 
inadequacy of Pirsig’s comments regarding the relationship of 
reason and the Good — at least in so far as his claims pertain to 
Plato’s mi ddle dialogues. Before turning to Plato’s later period,
I will discuss the Line analogy and the Cave allegory. The Line 
and the Cave images do complement and complete the Sun 
analogy, but my major reason for presenting them is to establish 
grounds for comparing the journey depicted by Plato’s Cave and 
Pirsig’s journey. 7'his section digresses from the paper’s main 
purpose, but the digression may provide useful tools for inter­
preting Pirsig. I will begin by describing Plato’s Line, for it is 
important to an adequate understanding of the Cave.
There is some scholarly debate concerning how the line 
should be drawn, but 1 feel confident that it should be drawn as 
a vertical line with its largest section at the top.6 Plato’s 
directions for constructing the line specify that the line should 
be divided unevenly, and then that each of the two sections 
formed should be divided in the same proportion as the first 
division. The line which emerges is a 4 section line, the sections
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being in the proportion 4:2;2:1. The top two sections represent 
the intelligible world, and the bottom two sections represent the 
visible world. The bottom two sections are most easy to explain: 
The bottommost section represents shadows and images of things 
in the sensible-world (e.g. a shadow of a tree), and the section 
immediately above represents the sensible things themselves 
(e.b. the tree).^ The top two sections of the line are distinguished 
in terms of the methods used to investigate intelligible objects. 
The bottom section of the intelligible world represents objects 
which are investigated by the method of hypothesis and the 
investigation involves use of sensible images. The objects 
represented by the top section of the line are investigated by 
dialectic and no sensible imagery is involved. The following 
diagram should help put the parts of the line in perspective.
intelligible
world
/ objects investigated
(1) by dialectic
(2) without use of sensible imagery
sensible
world
2
3
objects investigated
(1) by the method of hypothesis
(2) using sensible images
sensible objects 
plants, animals, artifacts
shadows and images of things in section 3
The Divided Line is presented at the end of Book VI of the 
Republic, and full appreciation of it depends upon a reading of 
the end of Book V and the earlier parts of Book VI. These sec­
tions of the Republic distinguish the philosophical from the non- 
philosophical life. Plato contends that those who spend their 
lives emphasizing the pleasures of the sensible world are mere 
lovers of spectables — spending their time on what is changing 
and unstable. More worthy is the philosophical life where one 
seeks the eternal unchanging world of the Forms. The Divided 
Line represents different grades of reality; progress up the line
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represents progress from the shadow world of the senses (for the 
sensible world is but a shadow of the intelligible world) to the 
intelligible world.
The Divided Line presents the different levels of reality, but 
it is the Cave allegory that discusses movement between levels. 
A subterranean cave symbolizes the sensible world, and the 
world outside the cave symbolizes the intelligible world. Plato 
first describes the region inside the cave. In the center of the 
cave there is a fire. Around the edges of the cave are prisoners, 
all chained in such a way that their backs are to the fire and they 
can only look at the cave wall in front of them. Between the 
prisoner and the fire is a wall. Lxtending above this wall are 
puppets, the shadows of which are cast on the cave wall by the 
fire. Given this physical set up the prisoners are only able to 
view the shadows of the puppets on the cave wall. These 
shadows clearly represent a very low degree of reality. Plato 
now describes the job of trying to raise these prisoners to see 
higher degrees of reality. The prisoners begin viewing shadows 
on the cave wall. As the prisoners are exposed to increasing 
degrees of reality they view the puppets which create the shadows 
and then the fire in the cave. At this point the prisoners are 
of the cave where they initially see shadows of 
sensible objects, then sensible objects themselves, and finally 
they reach the high point of their journey, vision of the sun. The 
various stages in the Cave allegory symbolize the stages repre­
sented by the Divided Line. The following chart presents the 
symbols and antitypes in the Cave and Line.
CAVE ALLEGORY 
(symbol)
Sun
LINE ANALOGY 
(antitype)
Good
sensible objects 
viewed directly
intelligible objects 
apprehended by dialectic
shadows of 
sensible objects
intelligible objects investigated 
by method of hypothesis
Fire Sun
puppets
shadows of puppets 
on cave wall
sensible objects viewed 
directly
shadows of 
sensible objects
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Thus the release of the prisoners represents t ™
the lowest level of the sensible world up into the^’ U
world and finally to a vision of the Good. If one 
£ .u r J • f 1 u i L achieves visionof the Good, one is truly a philosopher. But now the rub The
philosopher who has attained vision of the Good is not permitted 
to enjoy eternal bliss contemplating it; he or she must return to 
the cave in order to try to rescue others. Thus the cave allegory 
has two phases: the rise up out of the subterranean cave and the 
return down into the cave.8 The following diagrams present the 
journey depicted by the Cave and the intellectual journey the 
Cave symbolizes.
The Journey Depicted 
by the Cave
The Intellectual Journey Corresponding 
to the Cave
Vision 
of the 
Sun
return
to
the
cave
Vision 
of the 
Good
return 
to the 
sensible 
world
Although I do not wish to develop the comparison in great 
detail, I suggest that there are definite similarities between 
Plato’s Cave allegory and Pirsig’s journey across country. 
Pirsig’s journey takes him from the plains up to the top of the 
mountain and down to the sea. The geographical structure of 
Pirsig’s trip coordinates with the structure of Phaedrus’ journey. 
Phaedrus’ journey begins by examining concrete instances of 
quality in rhetoric classes and then moves into a purely intellec­
tual journey. On page 269 Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ intellectual 
journey.
But to understand the meaning of Quality in classic terms 
required a backup into metaphysics and its relation to 
everyday life. To do that required still another backup into 
the huge area that relates both metaphysics and everyday 
life — namely, formal reason. So I proceeded with formal 
reason up into metaphysics and then into Quality and then 
from Quality back down into metaphysics and science.
The following diagrams depicting Pirsig’s and Phaedrus’
19
journeys should be compared to the diagrams depicting Plato’s 
Lave allegory.
Pirsig's Journey 
Across Country
Mountaintop
seaside
Phaedrus' Journey
Quality
\
\bottom of 
\ the sea
The fact that the downsides of the arches are not identical is not 
problematic for Pirsig completes a journey wbicb Phaedrus does 
not. Phaedrus does not return to a life filled with concrete 
instances of quality but ends up in a mental hospital. At the end 
of the book Pirsig achieves a quality relationship with his son 
that Phaedrus had not achieved. Perhaps that is one reason that 
Pirsig says that he will meet Chris at “the bottom of the ocean’’ 
(pages 267 and 400) rather than at the oceanside: in so far as the 
cross-country journey is inadequate to symbolize what Pirsig 
achieved that Phaedrus did not.
I intend to undertake a brief comparison of Plato’s Cave and 
Phaedrus’ journey, but do not expect Plato’s Cave to provide a 
complete explanation of Pirsig’s symbolism. 4'he facts that 
Pirsig is very concerned with his own mental states and that he 
associates the ocean with “the deepest levels of subconscious­
ness’’ (397) suggest that psychological as well as philosophical 
tools are needed for complete interpretation. I am not in a posi­
tion to supply the appropriate psychological tools, but I hope 
that access to Plato’s Cave will provide relevant philosophical 
background for understanding at least part of what the book is 
about.
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The four diagrams I have presented, two arches depicting the 
journeys related to the Cave and two arches depicting the jour­
neys in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, provide the 
basis for my comparison. I have already presented the passage 
in which Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ journey in terms of a way 
up and a way down. Pirsig’s language is extremely similar to the 
language Plato uses in describing the path to apprehension of 
the Good. Plato’s description appears in the Divided Line 
analogy, but the Line is the prelude to the Cave.
Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the 
intelligible (the top section of the line) 1 mean that which 
the reason {ho logos) itself lays hold of by the power of 
dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute begin­
nings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, 
and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that 
which required no assumption and is the starting point of 
all, and after attaining to that taking hold of the first 
dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the con­
clusion . . ..(Republic 511bc)
Pirsig might well balk at Plato’s description of dialectic as the 
method which enables one to rise to the starting point of all, but 
the method Plato describes is not at odds with Pirsig’s general 
approach. Shorey translates ho logos as reason in this passage, 
but some scholars interpret dialectic as mental or mystical 
vision. Plato uses two different words to describe the mental 
state corresponding to the top section of the line. At 511e he 
calls that mental state noesis which suggests some sort of 
immediate apprehension, but at 534a he refers to the same state 
as episteme which suggests that it is knowledge attained by 
reason. Pirsig may refuse a mystical interpretation of Plato or he 
may not even be aware that such interpretations exist, but even 
if he insists that dialectic is reason, the similarity of his own 
approach to Plato’s is still evident.
From what 1 have said it should be apparent that there is a 
great deal of similarity between Plato s Good and Phaedrus 
Quality. In fact, at one point Pirsig says that he would have con­
sidered them the same except for the fact that Phaedrus vehe­
mently denied it (361). Pirsig later explains how Plato went 
wrong:
Plato hadn't tried to destroy arete. He had encapsulated it; 
made a permanent, fixed idea out of it; had converted it to a 
rigid, immobile Immortal Truth. He made arete the Good, the 
highest Idea of all. It was subordinate only to Truth itself, 
in a synthesis of all that had gone before. (373)
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Perhaps this passage gets at the heart of Phaedrus’ problems 
with Plato. Pirsig does not seem to understand the nature of the 
horms. I he Forms are not truths, but objects which make truth 
possible. Just as one must not confuse vision or color with the 
cause of vision and color, so too one must not confuse knowledge 
or truth with the cause of knowledge and truth. If Pirsig were to 
realize that Plato subordinates truth to Goodness he would find 
further similarity between their views. I suspect that the real 
issue between Plato and Pirsig is the absolute versus the 
relative nature of the Good, but I don’t find that Pirsig has 
addressed that question in any substantial way. I find the idea of 
mystical apprehension of a relative nature somewhat baffling, 
but I will not pursue that point since Pirsig avoids the issue.
There is one further similarity between Plato’s and Pirsig’s 
journeys whihc merits consideration. The second half of Zen and 
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is quite concerned with where 
Pirsig will meet Chris. At first one expects Pirsig to meet Chris 
at the top of the mountain. On page 222 Chris tells Pirsig about 
the previous night:
You said at the top of the mountain we’d see everything.
You said you were going to meet me there.
Pirsig does recall Phaedrus’ mystical apprehension of Quality 
at the top of the mountain, but he does not meet Chris there. 
These facts make sense when interpreted in light of Plato’s 
Cave. Phaedrus’ apprehension of Quality which takes place at 
the top of the mountain is quite like Plato’s apprehension of the 
Good. And just as Plato’s philosopher cannot meet those who 
have not made the journey into the intelligible realm while 
contemplating the Good, so too it makes sense that Pirsig cannot 
meet Chris at the top of the mountain. Chris has not shared 
Pirsig’s intellectual journey: if Pirsig wishes to meet Chris, he 
must return to the everyday world. Both the philosopher and 
Pirsig must travel their respective “downward paths’’ before they 
can adequately communicate with those who have not journeyed 
through the intelligible realm.
From this digression let us now return to the focus of this 
paper, the relationship between reason and the Good in the texts 
of Plato and Aristotle. Earlier I presented the Sun analogy as 
Plato’s clearest account of the relationship between reason and 
the Good in his middle dialogues. I suspect that Pirsig is not 
familiar with the later dialogue I now intend to discuss, the 
Philebus, but since Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus, is a transitional
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dialogue to Plato’s later period, I believe discussion of the 
Philebus is relevant. I do not wish to discuss the differences 
between middle and late Platonic dialogues in great detail, but 1 
do think it is significant to point out that the late dialogues 
involve a new (or if not new a greatly elaborated) account of the 
nature of dialectic. I have already presented Plato’s account of 
dialectic in the Republic: it is the method by which one rises to 
first principles. In the Phaedrus Plato characterizes dialectic as 
the procedures of collection and division:
Phaedrus: What procedures do you mean?
Socrates: The first is that in which we bring a dispensed 
plurality under a single form, seeing it all 
together — the purpose being to define so-and-so, 
and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen 
as the topic for exposition . . .
Phaedrus; And what is the second procedure you speak of, 
Socrates?
Socrates: The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled 
to divide into forms, following the objective 
articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off 
parts like a clumsy butcher . . ..{Phaedrus 265de)
The dialectician can identify what multiplicities share a single 
nature and thus unite them under one form, and he or she can 
also begin with one form and divide it into natural parts. The 
fact that Pirsig’s former self was so concerned with the pro­
cedures of collection and division helps explain why Pirsig 
refers to his former self as Phaedrus. Perhaps then Pirsig 
believes the later dialogues are where Plato subordinates the 
Good to reason. If that is what he wishes to contend, he owes 
us an account of the Philebus.
Ethical concerns play a major role in almost all of Plato’s 
early and middle dialogues, but not in many later dialogues. The 
Philebus, however, picks up earlier ethical concerns, particularly 
those expressed in the Protagoras and Republic, and it provides 
Plato’s final answer to the question: is pleasure or reason closer 
to the good? I trust I will not spoil the dialogue for those of you 
who have not read it by affirming what you already suspect: 
Plato believes reason is closer to the good than pleasure. He 
reaches this conclusion by hunting down the nature of the good.
Socrates: So now we find that the good has taken refuge 
in the character of the beautiful, for the qualities 
of measure and proportion invariably, 1 imagine.
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constitute beauty and excellence.
Protarchus: Yes indeed.
Socrat es: And of course we said that truth was included 
along with these qualities in the mixture.
Protarchus: Quite so.
Socrates: Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a 
single form, let us secure it by the conjunction 
of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then, 
regarding these three as one, let us assert that 
that may most properly be held to determine the 
qualities of the mixture, and because that is 
good the mixture itself has become so.
(Philehus 64e-65a)
Socrates then demonstrates that of the two, pleasure and reason, 
reason is closer to the good for it is closer to truth, proportion 
and beauty. Socrates ends by ranking things which contribute to 
a good life: (1) what possesses measure, (2) what is proportioned 
and beautiful, (3) reason and intelligence, (4) sciences, arts, and 
right opinions, and (5) pure pleasures of the soul, i.e. pleasures 
which do not also bring pain (Philehus 66abc). In light of this 
text I find it hard to see that Plato subordinated tbe good to 
reason.
At the beginning of this paper I said that Pirsig plays dirty. 
One reason I say that is that his book presents passages which 
suggest that he knows at least some of his statements are 
inaccurate. For example, at one point while discussing Aristotle, 
he says:
I have since read Aristotle again, looking for the massive 
evil that appears in the fragments from Phaedrus, but have 
not found it there. What 1 find in Aristotle is mainly a quite 
dull collection of generalizations, many of which seem 
impossible to justify in the light of modern knowledge, 
whose organization appears extremely poor, and which seems 
primitive in the way old Greek pottery in the museums seems 
primitive. I’m sure if I knew a lot more about it I would see 
a lot more and not find it primitive at all. But without know­
ing all that I can’t see that it lives up either to the raves of 
the Great Books group or the rages of Phaedrus. I certainly 
don’t see Aristotle’s works as a major source of either 
positive or negative values. But the raves of the great 
Books groups are well known and published. Phaedrus’ 
rages aren’t, and it becomes part of my obligation to dwell 
on these, (p. 353)
From this it appears that Pirsig does not believe that he can
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defend Phaedrus’ statements about Aristotle (and 1 suspect the 
same applies to Plato) on the basis of texts. But if Pirsig is 
unwilling to take responsibility for the accuracy of Phaedrus’ 
statements, on what ground can he find an obligation to dwell on 
“rages”? 1 suspect that the raves of the Great Books groups are 
known by a narrower audience than Pirsig’s book has reached. 
The end result is that competent scholars dismiss his work as 
ignorant undefended rages and the general public comes away 
with a terribly misguided impression of Plato and Aristotle. 
Competent scholars may well be at fault for not conveying their 
understandings to a wider audience, but on the scale of sins I 
find Pirsig’s slander more offensive.
Before turning to Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship 
between the good and reason, it seems appropriate to mention 
that Pirsig is as ignorant of the pre-Socratic philosophers (whom 
Pirsig refers to as cosmologists) and the sophists as he is of 
Plato and Aristotle. It is true that most pre-Socratic philosophers 
were particularly interested in cosmology, but it is equally true 
that some of the pre-Socratic philosophers were interested in 
ethics. Thus 1 find fault with Phaedrus’ search which Pirsig 
describes on page 373, “Phaedrus searched, but could find no 
previous cosmologists who had talked about the Good. Since he 
goes on to say that the sophists talked about the Good, he must 
not mean Plato’s Good; rather, he must mean the good life. But 
clearly some of the pre-Socratics were concerned about the good 
life. In different ways the good life is important to Heraclitus, 
the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. Consider, for example, the 
fragment from Democritus:
The man who chooses the good of the soul makes a more 
divine choice; he who chooses the good of the body makes 
a mortal choice.9
This fragment makes it clear that Democritus was concerned 
about the good life; other fragments discuss in more detail how 
the good life is achieved.
Pirsig’s treatment of the sophists is also distressing. He 
suggests, that it is the sophists who are most concerned about 
arete, i.e. excellence. But Pirsig has very little understanding of 
the arete the sophists discuss. On page 371 lightning hits 
Phaedrus;
Quality! Virtue! Dharma! That is what the Sophists were 
teaching! Not ethical relativism. Not pristine “virtue.” But 
arete. Excellence. Dharma! Before the Church of Reason.
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Before substance. Before form. Before mind and matter.
Before dialectic itself. Quality had been absolute. Those 
first teachers of the Western world were teaching Quality, 
and the medium they had chosen was that of rhetoric. He 
had been doing it right all along.
Lightning may have struck Phaedrus, but it’s too bad it didn’t 
bring illumination. I find no evidence in Pirsig’s text that the 
arete of the sophists is Phaedrus’ Quality. Indeed, my suspicion 
is that neither Pirsig nor Phaedrus have much understanding of 
the sophists view of arete. Pirsig mentions Protagoras’ view that 
man is the measure of all things, but the connection between that 
doctrine and Phaedrus’ Quality is very unclear. I suspect Pirsig 
would be surprised to learn that the arete Protagoras tried to 
teach was the ability to become a power in the city-state and the 
arete Gorgias tried to teach was the ability to help one’s friends 
and harm one’s enemies. “Arete” does mean excellence in 
Greek, but early Greek notions of what constitutes human excel­
lence are quite different from ours.^® Indeed, Socrates’ great 
contribution was to connect arete and reason: rather than separat­
ing quality and reason as Pirsig contends, the Greek philosophers 
(Socrates, Plato and Aristotle particularly) connected them in 
ways that had not been done previously.
I have already shown that Plato considered the Good and 
reason interdependent and that he considered reason subordinate 
to the Good. I will not discuss Aristotle in as great detail, but I 
will discuss the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics which 
explain the role of the good in Aristotle’s philosophy. Before 
doing that I would like to make two less important points: both 
emerge in response to Phaedrus’ attack on Aristotle’s treatment 
of rhetoric. Phaedrus complains:
As a branch of Practical Science it (rhetoric) was isolated 
from any concern with Truth or Good or Beauty, except as 
devices to throw into an argument. Thur Quality, in Aris­
totle’s system, is totally divorced from rhetoric. This con­
tempt for thetoric, combined with Aristotle’s own atrocious 
quality of rhetoric, so completely alienated Phaedrus he 
couldn’t read anything Aristotle said without seeking ways 
to despise it and attack it. (p. 3.58)
F'irst, Pirsig does not seem to know that Aristotle did not prepare 
the texts of his work which we now have. Aristotle’s exoteric 
works (the works written for distribution outside his school) are 
all lost. What we have now are texts compiled from the notes of 
Aristotle’s students. God forbid that the quality of my rhetoric 
ever be judged on the compilation of my students’ notes. Second,
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Pirsig must not understand Aristotle’s distinction between 
Theoretical and Practical Science. In his Introduction to Aristotle 
Richard McKeon, a highly respected scholar, distinguishes the 
ends of Aristotle s theoretical and practical sciences:
The end of the theoretic sciences is knowledge, and the 
subject matters which are investigated and the truths which 
are sought in them do not depeod on our action or our 
volition. The end of the practical sciences, on the other 
hand, is not merely to know, but rather to act in the light of 
knowledge; it is not the purpose of political science, for 
example, to know the good, but to make men good. (p. xxi)
At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle emphasizes 
that ethics is a practical science: its purpose is not merely to 
understand the nature of the good but to make humans good. If 
Pirsig understood Aristotle’s distinction, he would certainly 
approve Aristotle’s placing rhetoric in the practical sciences. 
Practical sciences are very much concerned with Truth, Beauty, 
and Goodness.
It is now time to examine Aristotle’s understanding of the 
relationship between reason and the good. The Nicomachean 
Ethics opens with the assertion:
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good 
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things 
aim. (1094a 1-4)
Aristotle then goes on to explain that different activities aim at 
different ends, and that the final end which we seek by pursuing 
diverse intermediate ends is the chief good. Thus Aristotle con­
tends that all our activity, intellectual and otherwise, is subordi­
nate in a certain sense to the good; whatever we do we do for 
the sake of the good.
Aristotle explains that it is generally agreed that the chief 
good which all humans seek is happiness, but that it is not gen­
erally agreed wherein happiness lies. Different Greeks argued 
that happiness consists in wealth or honor or pleasure, but 
Aristotle’s contribution lies in his attempt to argue that the 
highest happiness consists in reasoning and, in particular, 
philosophic contemplation. The whole thrust of the Nicomachean 
Ethics develops out of Aristotle’s contention that the function of 
man is activity guided by reason and that the good and happy man 
who performs his function well.
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Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which 
follows or implies a rational principle, ... and we state 
the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to 
be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational 
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and 
noble performance of these, and if any action is well per­
formed when it is performed in accordance with the appropri­
ate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to 
be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there 
are more than one virtue in accordance with the best and 
most complete. (1098a)
To this basic account of the human good Aristotle adds the 
further conditions that the human good includes virtuous activity 
throughout a complete life (1098a) and that the happy life requires 
a certain amount of external goods (1099a). When I discuss 
Aristotle’s view of human good, I will speak only of its main 
thrust, that human good (or happiness) is activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue, but the reader should keep in mind that 
this form is abbreviated.
The statement, “Human good is activity of the soul in accord­
ance with virtue,’’ may not strike anyone as tremendously insight­
ful, but I believe it becomes more significant as one sees what 
Aristotle is getting at. The Greek word for virtue is “arete” and 
arete is better translated “excellence.” Thus, human good is 
activity of the soul in accordance with excellence. The excell­
ence of the soul depends on the soul’s function. As the passage 
at 1098a makes clear, Aristotle believes that the function of the 
human soul is activity which implies a rational principle. The 
human soul performs its function best when it manifests two 
kinds of activity involving rational principles: intellectual 
activity and moral activity. When a soul reasons well and acquires 
truth, it possesses intellectual excellence. When truth is applied 
to action and a human uses reason to control his or her desires, 
excellence is present.!!
From my brief remarks about Aristotle’s ethics, I believe the 
relationship between the good and reason is apparent. The good 
is the final end of all human activity. Humans agree that the final 
end at which they aim is happiness. Aristotle contends that the 
highest happiness is produced by intellectual and moral virtue. 
These virtues or excellences of the soul are present in a soul 
which performs its function well, i.e. a soul which reasons well. 
Thus, according to Aristotle, the greatest good and reason are 
interdependent. The good is higher than reason, however, for we 
reason for the sake of the good.
28
Far from separating reason and the good both Plato and 
Aristotle argue for their interdependence, and far from subordinat­
ing the good to reason both Plato and Aristotle subordinate 
reason to the good. Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of 
Greek life.” But reason is also an important pemt of Greek life. 
Plato and Aristotle gave different accounts of the relationship of 
reason and the good, and yet both are convinced that the soul 
which embraces reason will live a happier and better life than 
the soul which rejects reason. Pirsig seems to be suggesting 
that in order to reach the highest good, he has to reject reason or 
to expand its normal domain. He seems to be suggesting that by 
moving into insanity he approaches a higher goal than reason 
permits. But look at the quality of his life prior to his being 
institutionalized. If that is the life which goind beyond the 
bounds of reason produces, I prefer not to be insane. I see no 
evidence whatsoever that insanity produces quality.
That is not to say, however, as Plato and Aristotle did not 
say, that reason and quality are identical. I believe Plato and 
Aristotle had it just right: reason and the good are interrelated, 
and reason helps to produce a quality life. Pirsig seems to 
believe that he has to leave the Western tradition in order to 
gain insight into how to achieve peace of mind. It is a shame 
that his understanding of the Greeks is so shabby for Greek 
philosophy would take him a long way in the direction he wishes 
to go. Aristotle tells us that eudaimonia (happiness or well-being 
of the spirit) occurs when humans function well — particularly 
when they reason well since rational activity is the particular 
function of man. I suggest that Pirsig owes a debt to Aristotle 
when he says:
The study of the art of motorcycle maintenance is really a 
miniature study of the art of rationality itself. Working on a 
motorcycle, working well, caring, is ... to achieve an inner 
peace of mind.l^
In order to work well at maintaining a motorcycle one must 
function according to rational principles. Humans who function in 
accordance with rational principles will function well. As a 
result they will achieve peace of mind, eudaimonia.
Perhaps what makes me maddest about Pirsig’s book is that 
everything I find in it of value, I find the roots for in Greek 
philosophy — and yet Pirsig has the gall to characterize Plato 
and Aristotle as villains ultimately responsible for the lack of 
care associated with modern technology. I hope this paper has
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demonstrated that Pirsig gives the Greek philosophers a bad rap. 
Neither Plato nor Aristotle would ever advocate doing what is 
reasonable even when it isn’t any good. That wouldn’t make any 
sense to them. Reason is a capacity of mind whose function is 
to promote the good. For Plato reason is either (1) what appre­
hends the Good or (2) what enables one to reach a further mental 
state which apprehends the Good. Then reason is used to help 
create quality in everyday life. For Aristotle reason is that which 
most effectively helps us attain the ends which we seek. Plato 
and Aristotle did not subordinate the good to reason; rather, they 
were among the first who pointed out the important role of reason 
in creating quality lives. If there is a villain in Zen and the Art 
of Motorcycle Maintenance (and I think that there is), he is not 
Plato or Aristotle. He is the slanderer.
INFORMAL FOOTNOTES
All references from Pirsig are from Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the 
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (New York; 
Bantam Books, 1976). Page numbers appear in the text of the paper 
throughout.
All references from Plato are from TAe Collected Dialogues of Plato 
edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 1961. The Aristotle 
references appear in Introduction to Aristotle edited by Richard 
McKeon, 1947.
'’• Scholars divide Plato’s work into early, middle, and late dialogues. 
Socrates is the main character in the early and middle dialogues, 
but the early dialogues are thought to reflect his views whereas the 
middle dialogues are thought to present Plato’s views. In the late 
dialogues Socrates is sometimes the main character, sometimes a 
minor character, and sometimes he does not appear at all. The 
Republic is a middle dialogue, and the Philebus is a late dialogue. 
References to Plato and Aristotle will be given via Stephanus 
numbers, the numbers which occur along the margins of most 
editions. Stephanus numbers refer to early manuscripts, and their 
use makes it easier to compare translations.
See Paul Shorey’s footnote in the Loeb edition of the Republic, 
1963, page 105. Many of you may be unfamiliar with the Loebs; they 
arc put out by Harvard University Press, and they present the Greek 
text on one page and an English translation on the opposite page.
The line should be drawn vertically because of its connection to the 
Cave where up and down are important. The top section should be 
largest because the top represents the greatest degree of reality.
Plato initially says that the bottom portion of the line represents the 
visible world. The visible world is eventually broadened in the Cave 
allegory to include all the sensible world.
My description of the Cave is but a poor shadow of the original. I 
encourage everyone to read Plato’s Sun, Line and Cave images at 
Republic 506b-520e. The passage is really quite short and well 
worth your time.
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9- See John Mansley Robinson. Av Introduction to Early Greek Philo­
sophy, 1968, page 229.
1*^- Greek notions of arete have been discussed in detail by Professor 
A. W. H. Adkins — Professor of Classics and Philosophy at the 
University of Chicago. He presents a valuable brief account of his 
findings in Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece. 
Book 1 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provides a general intro­
duction. Books II-V characterize moral virtue, and Book VI discusses 
intellectual virtue. Book Vll Discusses pleasure, and Books Vlll 
and IX analyze friendship. Book X brings the Ethics to a culmina­
tion with a final account of the good life. Those of you who wish to 
explore Aristotle’s Ethics can get an overview by reading Books I, 
11, VI, and X.
12. Pirsig’s prefatory remark presented inside the front cover.
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William T. Hamilton
TAKING PLEASURE WHERE YOU FIND IT
Why are you reading this? Why, for that matter, are you attend­
ing this seminar, when you could be playing handball, sleeping 
late, or, like Good King Wenceslas, gathering winter fu-el?
Probably one of your motives is a sense of duty, that virtue 
so dear to the puritan west, of deferring pleasure until the Just 
Reward, which comes precious because it comes late. Attending 
these seminars is an officially sanctioned and therefore unques­
tionably responsible use of the Intertefm and hence a useful thing 
to put in the blank on the Faculty Annual Report which asks you 
to account for your educational use of this period, which the 
Otterbein establishment insists is not to be considered a vaca­
tion. And, since most of you are now professors, you were 
probably good students in school and college, and, as we all 
know, good students always read their assignments. Your sense 
of duty no doubt goes a long way towards answering the simple- 
minded questions I began with.
I hope, however, that it doesn’t account entirely for your 
presence in the seminar, nor for your having read this far into 
this paper. I think that some part of the motivation is a hope, 
probably slight and diminishing by now, for “quality.” Maybe, 
just maybe, there might be something good down the line, if not 
on this page, perhaps on the next — a joke, an insight, something 
that would make one or two moments of reading distinguish them­
selves by their quality from other moments.
In the course of his attempt to define — or rather describe — 
the undefinable, Robert M. Pirsig associates “quality” with a 
number of concepts and intuitions. The one that interests me the 
most as a potential insight into the problems of teaching writing, 
however, is his association of quality with pleasure (see particu­
larly Chapter 19). “Pleasure” in turn he defines with a disarming 
simplicity: “what you like.” Stated that way, the concept of 
quality seems trivial, especially when you consider the vast 
array of things we think are wrong with the way our students 
express themselves on paper. Think of the dangers that face the 
professor who announces to his class that the papers he likes 
best are going to get the A’s and B’s, while the penalty for dis­
pleasing him on paper is going to be a D or F. What if a student 
claims that her D paper gave her (and, to make it even more
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perilous, let us say her roommate as well) a great deal of pleas­
ure, and the teacher’s dislike of it is simply a reflection of his 
own eccentric tastes? What possible defense does the teacher 
have against the student’s charge that he is relying on purely 
subjective criteria?
It is my current opinion (which means that I may be ready to 
change it at any moment under the right kind of challenge) that 
our only chance of solving the “Writing Problem” is to restore to 
the process of writing and to the teaching of writing this sense 
of quality-as-pleasure. I am further convinced that this is not a 
task that English teachers alone can hope to accomplish, that, 
for reasons I hope to establish, we are all teachers of writing, 
whether we teach English or nursing or philosophy. To meet this 
challenge, we need to come up with a convincing escape from the 
subjectivity trap, or, to put it differently, we need to find ways 
of pulling our students into the trap with us. One of the best 
things about Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is that 
Pirsig suggests some ways of pulling it off: ways of resolving 
the apparent difficulties of confessing to our own subjectivity, 
ways of involving the students as writers in events that are 
characterized by quality-as-pleasure, and finally specific ways 
of teaching quality when we teach writing. To follow Pirsig’s 
terms, we need to find ways of persuading the student to engage 
in a “caring” relationship with his work (see Chapter 24).
Let us begin this task with a touch of quality. The following 
sentence, extracted from a freshman theme written at the Univer­
sity of Washington twenty years ago, was proudly displayed on 
the bulletin board in the English office:
“The main difference between Christians and atheists
is that Christians believe in the Afterbirth.”
(If you didn’t find that funny, please read the sentence again. If 
you still don’t find it funny, I think I’ve lost you. Seek quality 
elsewhere, and let me know where you find it.)
With those of you who are still with me, I want to assume that 
this is a perfectly marvelous sentence, absolutely brilliant or 
perfectly inept depending on its context. I think it has three 
possible contexts, each readily distinguishable from the others 
in terms of quality:
Context 1:
As it stood, on the UW bulletin board. Here, the readers —
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mostly English teachers or advanced English students - got 
considerable pleasure from watching this student slip on his 
verbal banana peel and from participating vicariously in the 
delight of the freshman composition instructor who mined this 
gem from the barren waste that usually results from assigning 
this sort of topic to a group of freshmen (“Compare and contrast 
Christians and Atheists, Russia and the United States, High 
School and College, or Up and Down. 500 wds. minimum”). For 
our purposes, this is the least interesting of the possible con­
texts: there is probably no way we can improve the quality of our 
lives by asking each of our students to make at least one enter­
taining rreudian slip during the term.
Context 2:
In an essay in which the student deliberately plays with the 
words afterlife and afterbirth. In this context, the reader shares 
the writer’s sense of play, his sense of the infinitely varied 
possibilities of our shared language. We’ve only got one sentence 
here, but if this hypothetical student keeps this up, reading his 
paper, with its associations of the heavenly mysteries and barn­
yard realities, is going to be the highpoint of our evening of 
paper grading. We are going to share this writer’s pleasure in 
language.
Context 3:
Almost certainly the real one — the context of a theme by a 
miserably inattentive student who has no understanding of what 
he’s writing about and little confidence in his ability to choose 
words. The momentary pleasure of finding the slip soon gives 
way to despair: what can I do with a student who knows so little 
about his subject or his language that he falls into such an 
error? It’s like listening to a piano student who never practices, 
or watching a mechanically inept professor assemble a rotisserie: 
no pleasure here, only pain.
We evaluate the sentence differently depending on the context 
in which it appears, that context depending largely upon the 
intentions of the writer who presents the statement to us. We 
evaluate it, of course, for its quality (that seems to be a neces­
sary tautology as I try to work out what’s going on here), and 
that quality is a matter of the pleasure or displeasure we take.
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I’ve been relying heavily on the pronoun we in the last few 
paragraphs. 1 need now to defend that pronoun: it’s my main 
defense against the student’s charge that my grading standards 
are unfairly subjective. Let me, a, la Pirsig, resort to a bit of 
autobiography. 1 am confident in using the pronoun ^ we in my 
evaluation of the sentence because I ve shared the afterbirth 
anecdote with dozens of people since I first saw the sentence 
twenty years ago. A very few people didn t get it or thought it 
was disgusting. Most have reacted to it with pleasure. I belong,
I discover, to a language community which shares my evaluation 
of this utterance. I’m writing (I think) to a part of that community 
now. If my evaluation is subjective, it is certainly shared by a 
lot of people. We can’t point to the objective standards of quality 
by which we evaluate it, but neither can we still believe that our 
evaluation is eccentric, since it seems to be widely shared. 
Perhaps our standards are intersubjective, a term I kept expecting 
Pirsig to use, especially in Chapter 19, where he convincingly 
(to me, at any rate) demonstrates that quality is neither objective 
nor subjective. Our standards are intersubjective in the sense 
that they derive from our belonging to a community which, in a 
broad way, seems to agree about them. I think Pirsig is right in 
maintaining that to call our love or admiration for Beethoven, 
Tolstoy or Picasso purely subjective (and therefore somehow 
unreal) in simply silly.
Assuming that we can now safely say to a class of writing 
students that we are going to evaluate their work on the basis of 
the pleasure we take in reading it, how do we get our students 
involved in this pleasure-seeking community? I think Pirsig is 
highly instructive here, not only in his specific classroom experi­
ment, flawed as he admits it was, but also in the general approach 
his book takes to establishing the character of quality. I think 
one of the ways of analyzing the writing problem is along the 
lines of the classical/romantic split Pirsig identifies. Let me 
return to the student who insists that she and her roommate both 
thought the paper I gave her a D on was pretty good. (This, I’m 
sure you all realize, is hardly a hypothetical case.) I have found 
that such defenses are seldom coherent. The student can point to 
a sentence or two which she thinks constitutes the central idea 
of the paper; she can, if pressed, find a few details or facts that 
might be construed as supporting that idea, and she may be able 
to prove that she read the assignment on which the paper was 
based. But the defense is almost certainly one that relies on the 
surfaces of the paper and the thought that went into it. She 
thought that Sons and Lovers was about premarital sex, she’s 
against premarital sex, and here — right here — is where she
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said so.
What our student cannot do is identify underlying form in the 
paper. She can’t point to where she chose one word because it 
belongs to the same kind of analysis or structure of feeling as 
these other words she chose. She cannot show how she prepared 
the ground for her freshest insight, or attached one sentence or 
paragraph to another with skillful transitions. There was no 
strategy, no technique, to the writing decisions she made. And 
further conversation with her is likely to reveal that a major part 
of her resentment at the low grade is based on her sense that I 
take a technological approach to her writing, and she doesn t 
understand the technology. She’s in the same position as the 
professor trying to put together the rotisserie — she’s cut her 
thumb on the blasted thing, though she tried to follow the 
directions.
She’s right. The problem is a technological one, and I know 
the technology. I take pleasure in writing (when it’s going well) 
because I know how to do it; or, I know how to do it because I 
take pleasure in it. To apply Pirsig’s terms to the phenomenon,
I can experience quality events in my writing because I know how 
to care about the process. Events and caring are active phenom­
ena: I’ve learned how to please myself. (Not always, of course; I 
can sympathize with writing students because I often face the 
intractible: the writing problem where my capabilities in the 
technology seem to be inadequate. As Pirsig suggests, this is 
the time to drink coffee, take a nap, or, if it’s really intractible, 
go fishing.) What I hope to come up with is an essay or a poem; 
because I understand something about the underlying form, I know 
what to do, how to perform, to loosen the screw or mend the 
sentence.
It follows, I think, that instruction in writing must be instruc­
tion in caring. We must help the student to perform competently, 
but that means that we must design the instruction so that he 
experiences quality events in his writing. Most of our students 
are skillful in something: playing the tuba, kicking a football, 
arranging a bouquet. One way to begin may be to ask them to 
examine the underlying form of such skills. We take pleasure from 
what we do well, but if we look back at the processes by which 
we became competent at those things, I think we can identify 
stages at which we had to work very hard and experienced 
considerable discomfort because we didn’t understand the moves. 
As we become more accomplished, we are able to care: we can 
refine our skills, attend to more parts of our performance, develop
not only competence, but style and flair.
I think the writing problem most of our students have is the 
result of the fact that they have had very few pleasurable experi­
ences in their use of language. At least they seem to have had 
few such experiences with adults outside of the family. To con­
verse with a freshman, at least on first acquaintance, is to be 
sprayed with a shower of “likes” and “reallys,” “you knows” 
and “he goes.” To read his paper is an even more painful 
experience: even if he can spell and punctuate with some sense 
of the conventions, he writes as if he were walking through a 
minefield, conscious that each step may be his last, that his 
teacher may at any moment find the fatal comma fault, lack of 
agreement, misplaced modifier, or unsubstantiated generalization. 
Again, no pleasure, only pain. You can’t care in a minefield, only 
worry, and they’re not the same thing. You can only fear a tech- 
> nology you see little hope of mastering.
The first thing we have to do is to clear that minefield. If the 
student perceives (and he usually does) that his teacher is watch­
ing mainly for errors, not successes, his writing strategy is going 
to be the negative one of trying to avoid errors. Again, this is 
anxiety, not caring. I don’t mean we should stop marking errors: 
for one thing, I couldn’t stop myself from marking them. I have 
little control of my red pen when I see a sentence fragment, and 
ultimately we want to make the avoidance of error a part of 
caring. But we’ve also got to show the student that we are 
pleasure-seekers, watching for and responding to positive quality 
events: a word well-chosen, a familiar fact seen in a new light, 
a sentence that matches its thought neatly, even a footnote at 
just the right point and impeccably punctuated. Our marginal 
comments ought to be copious, and they ought to show that we 
are engaged in his thought process, that we are entertaining it, 
not merely poised to pounce on him when his thought deviates 
from ours. (What a rotten sense of power Stephen Daedalus s 
instructor must have felt when he wrote in the margin This 
paper has heresy in it!”) We are trying to establish a community 
here, trying to show him we share and take pleasure in his 
insights, assuming the best about his writing as long as we 
possibly can. Sometimes a certain duplicity may be required: I’ve 
had some success pretending to believe that a student chose a 
word or advanced a proposition with more skill than was in fact 
involved. Especially in a conference with a student, I can get 
him to refine an idea in rewriting he didn’t know he had, until it 
does in a real sense become his idea, with all the pleasure that 
comes with a sense of discovery — a sense, I think, we don’t
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The sense of community that the student achieves from having 
his paper read by a sympathetic, pleasure-seeking professor is 
only part of the caring-about-quality we need to establish with 
and for our students. They are going to write (we hope) largely 
alone, away from that intersubjective community that emerges 
when writer reaches reader. Our student writers need to start 
caring as soon as they sit down with that awesome piece of blank 
paper in front of them, and we need teaching strategies that will 
affect that performance from the outset.
1 have been impressed with two quite different proposals for 
the teaching of writing, both of which seem to me quite Pirsigian. 
1 suspect an effective college-wide attack on the writing problem 
might be devised borrowing from both. Both of them are highly 
critical of the current cry that all we need to do is to get Back to 
Basics. 1 agree; a sustained attempt to “teach grammar” is 
simply a way of building a better minefield.
The first approach is described in a highly readable little 
book called Writing and Learning across the Curriculum, 11-16, a 
study compiled by Nancy Martin and others of several imaginative 
programs in Britain. The key words are “across the curriculum.” 
The approach sounds simple-minded: we learn to write by writing 
about what we’re interested in. Many of my ideas here about 
adopting a pleasure-seeking rather than a mistake-hunting stance 
towards paper-marking were influenced by my reading of this book 
a year or two ago. Martin and her colleagues are writing about 
secondary education in Britain; given our sense that American 
college students can’t write very well, we can hardly dismiss the 
book as too elementary for our purposes. And the suggestion that 
writing should be incorporated with learning across the curriculum 
may turn something we’ve thought was a serious problem from the 
liberal arts perspective into an opportunity: our concern that our 
students are too narrowly career-oriented. If our students care 
deeply about nursing or accounting, let us assume that they’d 
like to learn to communicate that interest. Perhaps that enchant­
ment with the mysteries of double-entry bookkeeping might lead to 
a really good essay about it. I’d go further: if a student shows 
the slightest interest in anything, assign a paper!
often give a student the chance to feel. However we do it, the
goal IS to clear that minefield, build that community, establish
the sense that we are working toward the common goal of pleas-
ure. ^
It is not, of course, necessarily going to be an English
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teacher who uncovers that interest. Thus, again, writing across 
the curriculum. I have no patience with the argument that chemis­
try or business professors can’t teach writing. If you care enough 
about good writing to complain bitterly when you discover ugly 
bits in bluebooks and termpapers, you have the essential regard 
for quality that will enable you to help a student learn to eare as 
much as you do: admit that you belong to the community. For one 
thing, you can help combat one of the most pernicious results of 
our division of the curriculum along disciplinary lines; the 
students’ often-confirmed perception that written English is a 
language only English teachers care about. That makes it as 
difficult to teach written English as it is to teach Japanese in an 
environment where the student knows perfectly well he is highly 
unlikely ever to need to use the language naturally. Writing and 
Learning is full of humane, optimistic, practical advice about 
making assignments, responding to papers, and creating a sus­
taining, caring educational atmosphere; I recommend it highly.
The second approach, described by Richard A. Lanham in 
Style: An Anti-Textbook, is to take a frankly epicurean delight in 
language itself. Lanham agrues that composition instruction has 
suffered from a moralistic emphasis on “clarity,” in which we 
urge the students to “Be Clear” with the same futile fervor of a 
preacher urging them to “Be Good.” Lanham argues, persuasively 
I think, that few of our utterances are motivated solely by clarity. 
The prose that pleases us (as writers and readers) is much more 
active and affective than that, full of the desire to express and 
flatter ourselves, to adorn our shopworn thoughts for public pur­
poses. Lanham maintains that the subject matter of a writing 
class should be language itself, its ambiguities, its rhythms, its 
mysterious ability to accomplish (and sometimes to baffle) our 
complex intentions. Instead of inveighing against jargon, he 
urges us to study it, to translate one jargon into another, to learn 
what our language sounds like, to play with it, to pun with it, 
perform with it. I suspect that there is enough rhetorical tech­
nology in this book to make it more useful (or at least more 
accessible) to English teachers than to others, but Lanham too 
implies ways in which the whole faculty might get involved. 
What Lanham is urging is that we consider style “opaque” - 
that is, that we stop trying to read and write as if all that 
mattered to us was some fact or concept that the language con­
veys, not the language itself. We do react to the style (hence the 
frequency of such terms as ‘ elegance even in scientific dis­
course): let’s look at it more closely. If at least once a week in 
every course on campus, students were forced to slow down in 
their mad rush to accumulate knowledge and to examine the
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aual't which that knowledge was conveyed to them, the
tow T ^ language itself, we’d have gone a long way 
r s s owing them how to care about, how to take pleasure in, 
tneir own utterances.
ou an I read a lot; most of us write a lot, even if it’s 
os y memos and reports. Presumably one of the reasons we’re 
oing this is that we take pleasure in books, in words on a 
page not just from the philosophy or chemistry or pedagogy 
a we think we 11 find in or around or under those words, 
ertain y most of us suffer pain from the inept, ugly writing our 
u ®nts sometimes shamefacedly present for our inspection. Let 
us ta e courage from Pirsig: let us confess that, embarrassing as 
1 as old-fashioned and pre-Socratic and rhetorical as
you will, we know what we like.
00 much has happened to us as a language community to 
composition problem by a return to Basics. It’s a neat 
P oy or college professors and state legislators to blame elemen­
tary and secondary English teachers for the abysmal prose many 
young adults write today. If kids watch television instead of 
rea ing, call longdistance instead of writing to Granny to thank 
er for the sweater that didn’t fit, and play the guitar instead of 
siting a poem when they fall in love, no amount of sentence- 
iagramming is going to fill the gap. I don’t have a plan for the 
public schools; what I have tried to propose is an attempt to 
rescue the victims when they get to college. It must be a college- 
wide effort, however, an effort to share with our students the 
pleasure we take in language well used and to help them learn to 
care about the language we enjoy in common.
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Larry E. Cox
DICHOTOMIES, DELUSIONS AND DEPRESSION; DELIVERANCE
“What is this man, that we pay so much attention to him 
and this man’s son that we cry for him.’
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance^ belongs in a 
select genre of literature, one in which personal adaptation and 
crisis is the essence of the work and the novel is its form. It is 
essential in this genre that the work be largely autobiographical, 
the material bubbling up from the unfinished nature of a person 
in an immense struggle for integration and pleasure. Other than 
Zen, the major work in this area is the often-compared, Moby 
Dick. It would be a provocative and difficult task to disucss 
what other works should in fact gain admission to this genre; 
for while nearly every novel plays on this motif as an enhance­
ment of another, few seem to adopt it so starkly as the major 
form.
The book’s immense appeal aside from its genius of form is 
its authenticity in depicting a struggle for integration that most 
of us recognize as the deep resonance of a well-struck chord. To 
those who have adopted higher education as the way to search 
for answers to the serious predicaments of personal and social 
integrity, the metaphor of resonance may seem yet not close 
enough. Rather it may seem as though Pirsig and the reader are 
playing the same chord simultaneously on somewhat different 
instruments. Does this intuitive harmony suggest that Pirsig’s 
character somehow represents a more general adaptive difficulty 
present in our current culture?
Rollo May, an existential psychiatrist, suggests that by 
attending to those persons who become disorganized in a particu­
lar culture we can predict the general personal and social 
problems that will, with time, predominate. The notion is that 
persons particularly sensitive to a given stress respond most 
adversely thus becoming harbingers of things to come for the 
general populace. If this is probable, then Pirsig’s dilemma and 
the vicarious struggle most readers report call for an honest 
assessment of Phaedrus/Pirsig.
iRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An 
Inquiry into Values (New York: Bantam Books, 1976). All quotations 
from this book are designated by page number in the body of the paper.
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In this essay I will attempt a clinical assessment of the 
personality revealed in the book. Since a complete clinical 
analysis would be nearly as lengthy as the book, I will neces­
sarily be sharing only a sample of the salient material. I 
the process to you as a provocation to your own analysis. While 
I offer It with a modesty to which any experienced clinician with 
scores of analytic misjudgments and cul-de-sacs must confess, I 
likewise offer it with a confidence gained from intuiting accur­
ately on numerous occasions.
Z,en is not an attack on reason. It demonstrates the difficulty 
a person dedicated to “pure reason” has integrating the non- 
rational aspects of his person - particularly the emotional 
aspects. As Pirsig says of Socrates dialogue of the One, “• • • 
the seeker, trying to reach the One is drawn by two borses, one 
white and noble and temperate, and tbe other surly, stubborn, 
passionate and black. The one is forever aiding him in h'® 
upward journey to the portals of heaven, the other is forever 
confounding him” (p. 382). Dichotomies such as this, and the 
process of creating such dichotomies as a major personal style 
of understanding, create immense adaptive strain. In the healthy 
personality such dichotomies are viewed as polarities and syn­
thesis or integration achieves the necessary balance. For 
example, persons who conceptualize themselves and others in 
terms of strength and weakness often choose to identify with 
strength or weakness predominantly. When this habitual identifi­
cation with strength or weakness is threatened — when the strong 
person must recognize weakness or the weak person must do 
something calling for strength, crisis is imminent. For the person 
comfortable with elements of each within, synthesized and demon­
strated in everyday affairs, crisis is often averted and personal 
vitality evident.
Dichotomizing often leads to the creation of delusions. Dichot­
omies implore us to allegiance. We must decide — to be or not to 
be, to sell or not to sell, to kill or not to kill. While there are 
positive elements to such definition, nearly always the decision 
suffers from lack of awareness of contextual realities. As often 
as I have shared decisive moments with clients deliberating 
suicide, 1 am even more awestruck than ever, at the sharp focus 
on a single issue such a struggle represents. Life has come down 
to a single intellectual choice, to go on or to end it. To go on 
represents probable suffering and misery; to end it means relief 
and in some sense probable pleasure. Reality is relatively unim­
portant at that moment; the decision will more than likely be 
reached on the basis of delusion, some belief concocted and
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accepted at that moment.
Phaedrus moves from dichotomy to (p. 339-340) delusion in 
such a way.
He had become so caught up in his world of Quality meta­
physics he couldn’t see outside it anymore and since no one 
else understood this world, he was already done for.
I think he must have felt at the time that what he was saying 
was true and it didn’t matter if his manner of presentation 
was outrageous or not . . .
This was it. He really believed ... It was a totally fanatic 
thing. He lived in a solitary universe of discourse in those 
days.
Few persons reach this level of delusion. Instead some flock to 
others who share their belief system. While this is nearly the 
same thing if the belief system is quite homogenous, there is a 
different reality about consensus. While being angry towards 
those outside of the belief system you can nevertheless share 
pleasure with those inside.
Since the world is rarely as simple as our delusions of belief 
systems would indicate, most delusional people experience 
eventual depression when the walls separating the dichotomies 
begin to leak. It’s as if some self-correcting force exists inde­
pendently and chisels away at weak spots in the wall. Attention 
then must be directed almost exclusively at the wall, its repair 
and maintenance. Since there is no growth in that, productive 
activity ceases and despair takes over. This is evident in 
Phaedrus’ definition of the mythos (p. 345).
The mythos grows this way. By analogies to what is known 
before. The mythos is a building of analogues upon ana­
logues upon analogues. These fill the boxcars of the train of 
consciousness. [Notice the parallel to the development of a 
delusional system.] The mythos is the whole train of col­
lective unconscious of all communicating mankind. Every 
last bit of it. [What a force to have on the other side of the 
wall.] The Quality is the track that directs the train. What 
is outside the train, to either side - that is the terra 
incognita of the insane. He knew that to understand Quality 
he would have to leave the mythos. That’s why he felt that 
slippage. He knew something was about to happen, (p. 344).
Phaedrus had earlier declared that “to go outside the mythos is 
to become insane.” That definition of reality and the accompany­
ing fear led Phaedrus into despair, then to frenzied activity of
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him anfi f attacks on all those forces which threatened
''■m, and finally to total depression.
Despair
grows now (p. 325).
\t> r ^jrived at the University of Chicaffo already
a wor of thought so different from the one you or I 
understand (p. 331).
Hostility
Hostility is really his element . . . down from the 
mountains to prey upon the poor innocent citizens of this 
intellectual community (p. 386). [All of whom to Phaedrus 
were absorbed in the mythos.]
lines are defined quickly. And the analogy to a classic 
a e or survival among lower animals is striking.
PI, doorway there are some footsteps, and then
ae rus suddenly knows — and his legs turn rubbery and 
IS an s start to shake. Smiling benignly in the doorway 
stands none other than the Chairman.
• Courtly, grand, with imperial magnanimity (p. 379).
e perceives the other students as having seats in the arena, 
e student whom the chairman had previously ridiculed is seen 
seat to the beating up of Phaedrus. The attack 
Will begin, he thinks, with an attempt to “destroy his status 
ialectically and when he finished off he will be asked to 
shape up or act out.” As the real battle wages Phaedrus, dis­
guised in a beard, begins to gain courage. He is well into the 
dialogue of the class before the Chairman recognizes him — 
gleam in his eye shows he recognizes who his bearded assailant 
IS. The struggle continues. The Chairman commits a blunder in 
interpretation and Phaedrus seizes the opportunity and “raises 
his hand, palm flat out, elbow on the table. Where before his hand 
was shaking it is now deadly calm” (p. 383), Phaedrus delivers 
his blow, his whole survival at stake, lie bides his time then 
strikes again. “The Chairman falters and hesitates, acts afraid 
of his class and does not really engage them” (p. 384). The 
student on the sideline now enters the fracus, seething in pent 
up anger. Phaedrus delivers another brutal attack and the fight 
ends. Hut victory is sweet for a very short time. There is a lack 
of authenticity in his overstated hostility and Phaedrus knows it. 
Ihe next day we find him “making one last attempt somehow to 
be nice at the next session of the class but the Chairman isn’t 
having any.” Unlike the battle of the lower animals where 
dominance is clearly established the victory here brings great 
despair.
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Meanwhile at the Navy Pier the students are fascinated with 
Phaedrus. They are eager to hear this “strange bearded figure 
from the mountains.” If simple recognition had been his goal this 
clearly would have held him in good stead but the issue he waged 
was much different. To have given into such wooing of popularity 
would have been to give in somehow to the mythos.
Phaedrus “is no shepherd either and the strain of behaving 
like one is killing him ... his days as a shepherd are coming to 
an end too. And he wonders more and more what is going to 
happen next.” The last spiral toward the bottom picks up speed. 
Note the passivity and spectator quality that characterizes him 
in the previous quotation. The small flicker of remaining hostility 
is now directed towards the classroom. “It is not his nature to 
talk and talk and talk for hours on end and it exhausts him to do 
this, and now having nothing left to turn upon, he turns upon this 
fear.” He comes to the classroom and sits in silence. Class after 
class.
Psychotic Depression
Thus is ushered in deep depression with its characteristic 
symptoms. Sleep time has dwindled to nothing. The city closes 
in on him. He wandres aimlessly for three days and finally ends 
up back in the apartment staring at the wall. He is no longer 
responsive to others. His thoughts are slowing down. His percep­
tion of his own body undergoes bizarre changes. Cigarettes burn 
themselves out between his fingers with no indication that he 
feels them. He sits in his own urine. Yet even in such a state 
the climax comes with his realization that “his whole conscious­
ness, the mythos, has been a dream and no one’s dream but his 
own, a dream he must now sustain at his own efforts. Then even 
‘he’ disappears and only the dream of himself remains with him­
self in it.” (p. 391).
I don’t believe I have ever read a more adequate description 
of depression and particularly of the demise of the fragmented 
ego that supports this sort of consciousness. It is an accurate 
picture, one that occurs again and again but a view which usually 
occurs in the perspective of the clinician or aware family-member 
who sees the symbolism behind the obvious behaviors. Here we 
have a striking description of the progressive changes in con­
sciousness that in some eerie sense reverse the order of the way 
consciousness develops in the infant, culminating in a unique 
moment of unbirth described in what I consider one of the two or
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three most poignant passages in the book.
never betravpr?**K^?^’ fought so hard for, has
now makes itse’lf c” eaJ to dT'^ has never once understood,
Clear to him and his soul is at rest.” (p. 391).
Deliverance:
nicks nr!'*' of its unique form the story
back at the ^P' rather
iournev P’ ' We 11 call the man on the motorcycle
inteerItio^"wh^ journey is a search for an illusive self- 
deliisin I oi^phasis on dichotomy is tempered and his
nnlarJt f^^^'t'es minimal (perhaps the beginning sense of 
emerging) integration appears only as a very distant 
possibility. Pirsig describes himself in fact as
saved liis^ ® recanted, and thereby in everyone’s eyes
down insid 'll! ' 'jeryone s eyes but one who knows deep 
down inside that all he has saved is his skin.
I survive mainly by pleasing others. You do that to get 
and’ .1.° ^‘Rdre out what they want you to say
nnsaiKr" much skill and originality as
fp. 3%)! " convinced, you get out
But I believe his behavior was chosen for other than the pure 
deception of others. He is trying on the other polarities. He 
continues;
If 1 hadn’t turned on him I’d still be there, but he was true 
to what he believed right to the end. That’s the difference 
between us, and Chris knows it. And that’s the reason why 
sometimes [ feel he’s the reality and I’m the ghost.
The prospects of reintegration are very awesome to Pirsig. 
Recognition of Phaedrus brings the renewed threat of insanity, 
but the desire for integration, perhaps the need for integration, 
makes it impossible to leave Phaedrus alone. What an awesome 
position. Ibw frightening and all-encompassing is the dilemma. 
E.arly in the journey (p. 62) Pirsig has a dream which clearly 
indicates his level of fear of Phaedrus and paints a picture of 
Pirsig’s defense against it.
In the fog there appears an intimation of a figure ... I am 
about to say something, to call to it, to recognize it, but 
then do not, knowing that to recognize it by any gesture or
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action is to give it a reality which it must not have. But it 
is a figure I recognize even though I do not let on. It is 
Phaedrus.
Evil spirit. Insane. From a world without life or death.
The figure fades and 1 hold a panic down . . . tight . . . 
not rushing it . . . just letting it sink in . . . not believing 
it, not disbelieving it . . . but the hair crawls slowly on the 
back of my skull ... he is calling Chris . . .
While this behavior indicates unreasonable fear it is also a part 
of the healing process. He must let Phaedrus through but he must 
do it in manageable bits. Note in particular the movement away 
from delusion — “not believing it, not disbelieving it,” thus 
trying to experience the phenomenon for what it is.
Pirsig has also begun to apply the principles of Zen he has 
garnered from his time in the Orient. He has learned that a here 
and now time orientation is critical to successful adaptation. 
This is a concept emphasized in most current psychotherapy. 
Persons predominantly oriented toward the past or future cannot 
experience and understand the ^present. Pirsig develops this 
insight in his comparison between ego-climbing and selfless 
climbing (p. 206). While
to the untrained eye they may appear identical . . . what a 
difference. The ego-climber is like an instrument that’s out 
of adjustment. He puts his foot down an instant too soon or 
too late. He’s likely to miss a beautiful passage of sunlight 
through the trees . . . He looks up the trail trying to see 
what’s ahead even when he knows what’s ahead because he 
just looked a second before . . . He’s here but he’s not 
here. He rejects the here, is unhappy with it, wants to be 
farther up the trail but when he gets there will be just as 
unhappy because then it will be “here.” What he’s looking 
for what he wants, is all around him; but he doesn’t want 
that because it is all around him. Every step’s an effort, 
both physically and spiritually, because he imagines his 
goal to he external and distant.
As the parallel journeys of Pirsig and Phaedrus roll on, Pirsig 
is aware of Phaedrus’ obsessiveness and resolves to be different
(p. 217).
He (Phaedrus) wasn’t interested in any kind of fusion of 
differences between these two worlds. He was after some­
thing else — his ghost. 1 (Pirsig) differ from him in that I’ve 
no intention of going on to that end. He just passed through 
this territory and opened it up. 1 intend to stay and cultivate 
it and see if 1 can get something to grow.
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Productivity — growth, Pirsig is no longer focused on th®
I’o the careful reader his growing strength is evident but somehow 
masked by the parallel account of Phaedrus who, at this juncture, 
is in the stage of despair. He is more ready now to allow th® 
image of Phaedrus to become distinct. The difficulty of t e 
integration is clear. Phaedrus is the one of Quality and Pirstg 
awakes from another frightening dream to see that
He’s waking up. A mind divided against itself . . . me . • • 
I’m the loathsome one ... I always knew he would come 
back . . . It’s a matter of preparing for it . . . (p. 325).
Phaedrus is so much with him now, almost indistinguishable an 
the expectation of the accompanying insanity is nearly too much. 
But again this is a different journey. Pirsig, taking in 
beauty around him, capturing the newness of his existence, seems 
to shout a growing awareness in the form of a question. 
can I love all this so much and be insane? 1 don’t believe it- 
Both Phaedrus and Pirsig then agree, are unified in the recogni­
tion that “the mythos is insane.’’ “The mythos that says the 
forms of this world are real but the Quality of this world is 
unreal, that is insane.”
That. That now. That ties it all together. It feels relieving 
when that happens (p. 346).
But Pirsig is not easily convinced. Reality is fuzzy. He can t 
quite accept this level of integration. It is somehow still role­
like and ill-fitting. But the scene is now set for the final integra­
tion, this one centering on the most cherished concern of both 
Phaedrus and Pirsig — Chris. (How I would love to stop and deal 
with the development of this relationship, but I will suggest only 
the drama of the relationship in the finale and urge you to go back 
and mine the beauty that is there.) Both Phaedrus and Pirsig 
have frequently called out to him in caring unutterable groans.
It is near the end of the trip. Chris has become nearly 
unmanageable. Pirsig is angry, afraid and then struck with a deep 
awareness (p. 345).
I can imitate the father he’s supposed to have, but sub­
consciously, at the Quality level, he sees through it and 
knows his real father isn’t here. In all this Chautauqua talk 
there’s been more than a touch of hypocrisy. Advice is given 
again and again to eliminate subject-object duality, when 
the biggest duality of all, the duality between me and him, 
remains unfaced. A mind divided against itself.
But with the recognition of the division, Pirsig still sees no way
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to undo the division. The intellectual bed is made. Reason has 
done its part. It is left for emotion to pull down the covers and 
welcome the struggling parts to rest together. As Pirsig shares 
his most intimate fears with Chris, the boy stands imploding 
against the most terrifying possibility of loss in the universe, 
one he knows so well in a not too distant memory. He shrieks 
with a shriek so congruent with the pain he feels that it pene­
trates to the very soul of his fathers (p. 401).
I don’t know what to do now. I have no idea what to do.
It’s all over. I want to run for the cliff, but fight that. I have 
to get him on the bus and then the cliff will he all right.
Everything is all right now, Chris. That’s not my 
voice. / haven't forgotten you . . . How could I forget 
you . . . We'll be together now . . .
The integration is complete. The voice validates the integra­
tion Pirsig has been searching out. Growth is again possible. 
The storm has passed. Chris asks a critical question “Were you 
really insane” and the answer comes out like the clean smell 
after the rain. “No” . . . Chris’s eyes sparkle. “1 knew it” he 
says.
I would like to believe at this point that Pirsig is alive and 
well and living in the Azores, or anywhere. All my attempts to 
discover his whereabouts have turned up nothing. His publishers 
have no address and there are no disciples in the publishing 
house who seem to care. Apparently the rumor that he committed 
suicide is untrue. Perhaps it was created by some perverse spirit 
who wanted to dash our belief in integration against the dividing 
wall of dualism. I feel at this moment somehow repentant that I 
could have believed such a rumor. While my clinical realism, 
grown out of the soil of prevalence, incidence and prognosis data 
reminds me of how hard it is for such integration to occur in such 
a personality, there is some deep internal sense that Quality will 
tip the seemingly uneven scales in the direction of integrity.
In Pirsig’s latest writing in Esquire in 1977, Pirsig is still 
together. He has exchanged motorcycle for sailboat but he’s still 
dealing with the topic of depression. The integration theme is 
stronger here — he’s integrating everything in sight (p. 68).
This self that one discovers (when sailing for long periods 
of time) is in many ways a person one would not like one’s 
friends to know about; a person one may have been avoiding 
for years, full of vanity, cowardice, boredom, self-pity, 
laziness, blamingness, weak when he should be strong.
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aggressive when he should be gentle, a person w o wi 
anything not to know these things about himself ^ ^ 
same fellow who has been having problems with cruising 
depression all this time. I think it’s in the day-after- ay, 
week-after-week confrontation of this person that the mos 
valuable learning of virtue takes place.
But if one will allow time enough ... a certain 
standing of one’s self will break through . • • f i
you are bored or exicted, depressed or elated, successtu or 
unsuccessful, even whether you are alive or dead, all t is 
is of absolutely no consequence whatsoever.
This ending while perhaps more cynical and more Sartre-like 
very similar to his major advice, his psychotherapeutic pre 
•iption in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
So the thing to do when working on a motorcycle, as in any 
other task, is to cultivate the peace of mind which does not 
separate one’s self from one’s surroundings (including is 
other selves). When that is done successfully then every­
thing else follows naturally” (p. 290).
Paul L. Redditt
THE LOTUS AND THE WRENCH *
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
ZEN BUDOHISM ON ROBERT M. PIRSIG
The title of Pirsig’s book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance would seem to invite if not demand a comparison of 
Pirsig’s thought with Zen Buddhist thinking. Accordingly, the 
thesis of this study is that Pirsig’s thought can be partially 
explained and evaluated from the perspective of Zen fduddhism. 
Before one even begins that explication, however, a disclaimer 
immediately following the title page of the book must be 
addressed. Pirsig writes;
What follows is based on actual occurrences. Although much 
has been changed for rhetorical purposes, it must be 
regarded in its essence as fact. However, it should in no 
way be associated with that great body of factual informa­
tion relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice. It’s not 
very factual on motorcycles, either,1
Pirsig explicitly denies that what follows in his book is factual 
about Zen or motorcycles, despite the title of the work. We have 
then a book which purports to be fact but not factual about its 
title. But if the book is not “factual” about Zen or motorcycles 
as scholars or technicians understand “factual,” it does never- 
the less deal with the “fact” of persons, motorcycles, and Zen 
in that existential crucible of experience, the college of hard 
knocks, in which Pirsig has tried, tested and “proved” his 
“facts.” Pirsig thus assumes the right to speak to us of Zen and 
motorcycles, of romance and technology; he assumes the right to 
speak to us of the art (not the technology) of motorcycle mainte­
nance. In short, Pirsig denies the very dichotomies which he 
thinks tear the fabric of our society. He speaks instead from a 
vision which unifies all dichotomies. This vision, tested both in
*The title of this paper is derived from the recurring image of a lotus 
(a Buddhist symbol) with an open end wrench protruding from it. This 
symbol appears on the cover and at the beginning of each chapter in the 
Bantam edition of Zen and the Art oj Motorcycle Maintenance.
IRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance; An 
Inquiry into Values (New York: A Bantam Book, 1976). All quotes from 
Pirsig are from this edition and are hereafter cited in the text of the 
paper by page number.
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the Church of Reason (his term for the university setting), in the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (Pirsig was once admitted to a mental hospital), 
and on the back of a motorcycle, is more Eastern than Western, 
more Zen than Christian in its emphasis on monism. Perhaps, 
then, it will further our understanding of Pirsig if we test Pirsig’s 
Zen “facts” against that factual body of Zen Buddhist thought 
and practice.
In the pursuit of Pirsig’s Zen (if there is such a thing as an 
idiosyncratic Zen), I propose the following steps; first we shall 
note his initial acquaintance with Eastern ideas and review how 
Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ (Pirsig’s name for himself before his 
mental collapse) salori or enlightened breakthrough to his vision. 
Our next three steps will follow him along the way of Zen, artic­
ulating Pirsig’s insight with regard to the insufficiency of 
reason, the unity of knowledge, and the importance of the present. 
Our fifth step, unfortunately, will land us in a pitfall (as judged 
from a Zen perspective) that Pirsig did not avoid. Finally we will 
conclude by taking stock of ourselves as we assess the implica­
tions of Pirsig’s work.
/. Initial encounters with Eastern thought
For a book employing the name Zen in its title, Pirsig’s essay 
makes surprisingly few direct references to Zen Buddhism or to 
Eastern thought more generally. Among those references, how­
ever, are several that indicate Pirsig’s early contacts with 
Oriental philosophy. During Pirsig’s early adulthood (i.e. after 
being expelled from the University), he served in Korea with the 
United States Army. His contact with things oriental — sliding 
doors, slate roofs, and open marketplaces — filled him with 
emotion. In addition he met and conversed with Korean laborers. 
But most importantly he read F. S. C. Northrup, The Meeting of 
East and West, which caused Pirsig to see the dichotomized 
existence of Western man. Northrup proposed that, instead of 
thinking in dichotomies. Westerns would do well to learn to think 
in continua. I'hat is, the either/or emphasis of Western dialeetieal 
thinking should be replaced with the both/and emphasis of 
Eastern thinking. Pirsig’s second contact with the East included 
living and studying in India just long enough to be completely 
repulsed by the Indian notion that the phenomena of this world 
are actually only temporary, hence illusory, appearances of the 
underlying one. Thus a possible source for learning about unified 
vision of knowledge was rejected by young Phaedrus because of 
his conviction of the reality of war and atrocity.
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Precisely how and when Pirsig narrowed his Eastern focus 
and began to study Zen and to what extent he pursued that study 
he does not tell us. When, however, he comes to describe 
Phaedrus’ breakthrough, his discovery of Quality, Pirsig’s 
language and even the structure of his essay take on overtones of 
the Zen experience of enlightenment called satori. Two passages 
in particular attract my attention. Chris and Pirsig are climbing a 
mountain overlooking Bozeman, Montana where Phaedrus had 
taught rhetoric at Montana State College. Pirsig is interweaving 
Phaedrus’ discovery of Quality, the concept which unifies all 
dichotomies in Pirsig’s thought, with his narrative of his return 
to Bozeman. Phaedrus had come so far as to discern three prin­
ciples behind the world: mind, matter, and Quality (p, 232). 
Phaedrus examines this “Trinity” closer:
I don’t know how much thought passed before he arrived at 
this, but eventually he saw that Quality couldn’t be inde­
pendently related with either the subject or the object but 
could be found only in the relationship of the two with each 
other. It is the point at which subject and object meet.
That sounded warm.
Quality is not a thing. It is an event.
Warmer.
It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the 
object.
And because without objects there can be no subject — 
because the objects create the subject’s awareness of him­
self — Quality is the event at which awareness of both 
subjects and objects is made possible.
Hot,
Now he knew it was coming.
Tliis means Quality is not just the result of a collision 
between subject and object. The very existence of subject 
and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event.
The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects 
which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the 
Quality (pp. 233-4).
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Here is the heart of Phaedrus’ discovery I et j n r.
. f J- ir ni / dwell first onthe event o the discovery itself. Phaedrus had pursued Quality
as a thing. He came to realize that it is an event; it is the reali
zation of the contindua Northrup wrote about PtmoJ > i • i •
.1 1 .• 1 L j •. "aearus thinking,the analytical process, had run its course and intuitive insight
had emerged. Now Phaedrus reversed the direction • i -
1 j t Ai 1 his thinking;he reasoned from, not to. Quality. As 1 understand Pirsig Qualit
is not the object of intellectual pursuit; it is the event or the
vista from which all intellectual pursuit begins It ,i,, . , , 11 • 1 1 . 11 IS not the con­
clusion of the syllogism but the major premise. Because there is
Quality there are subject and object, mind and matter. Phaedrus 
had searched for Quality until it found him, and he “saw” for the 
first time. What he saw was that there is no seer without a seen; 
there is no seen without a seer; there is only the process of see­
ing, only the continuum and not the dichotomy.
Pirsig reinforces his presentation of this breakthrough by 
means of the structure of the story he writes. Just at the point 
Pirsig tells of Phaedrus’ insight, his solving of the dilemma, 
Chris climbs above the treeline of the mountain they are climbing 
and shouts: “Blue sky!” They race to the summit and there — 
from their new perspective — the mountain, the forest, and the 
valley lie below them, and they see clearly the whole picture, 
the whole lay of the land, for the first time.
Zen, however, does not put any stock in living on mountain 
tops. As D. T. Suzuki once put it: “F'irst you’ve got to get on 
the camel; then you’ve got to get off the camel.” Pirsig recog­
nizes this: “...there are no motorcycles on the tops of mountains, 
and in my opinion very little Zen. Zen is the “spirit of the 
valley, not the mountain. The only Zen you find on the top of 
mountains is the Zen you bring up there” (p. 240). So Chris and 
Pirsig descend the mountain, but the Chautauqua continues as 
Pirsig recounts in more detail Phaedrus’ realization of his 
insight.
Then, on impulse, Phaedrus went over to his bookshelf and 
picked out a small, blue, cardboardbound book. He’d hand- 
copied this book and bound it himself years before when he 
couldn’t find a copy for sale anywhere. It was the 2400- 
year-old Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu. He began to read through 
the lines he had read many times before, but this time he 
studied it to see if a certain substitution would work. He 
began to read and interpret it at the same time.
He read (from the opening chapter of the Tao Te Ching)*:
The quality that can be defined is not the Absolute
54
Quality.
That was what he had said.
The names that can be given it are not absolute names.
It is the origin of heaven and earth . . .
Phaedrus read on through line after line, verse after verse 
of this, watched them match, fit, slip into place. Exactly.
This was what he meant. This was what he*d been saying 
all along, only poorly, mechanistically. There was nothing 
vague or inexact about this book, it was as precise and 
definite as it could be. It was what he had been saying only 
in a different language with different roots and origins. He 
was from another valley seeing what was in this valley, not 
now as a story told by strangers but as a part of the valley 
he was from. He was seeing it all (pp. 246-8).
* (Citation by the author of this essay.)
To be sure Pirsig speaks in this passage not of a Zen text, 
but of the Tao Te Ching, the seminal text of philosophical 
Taoism. I'here is, though, a sense in which Zen Buddhism is 
Indian Buddhist meditation filtered through Chinese Taoist 
thought. If Pirsig could substitute the word “Quality” for the 
word “'I'ao” in the text, a Zen Buddhist would be pleased to 
substitute the term “Buddha Nature,” the underlying Reality 
which resolves all dichtomies in Zen monism. Pirsig’s text was 
Taoist, but his thought had been appropriated from the Tao Te 
Ching Buddhists centuries before. Phaedrus’ experience, then, 
is cast by Pirsig as a Zen enlightenment, the granting of a new 
insight that (so Zen Buddhists say) allows one to see the world 
and everything in it for the first time. The contents of this Zen 
vision are not transferable by words, only by experience: Never­
theless Zen Buddhists from time to time attempt to give us 
glimpses of that new vision. At least three very typical com­
ponents of that vision appear in Pirsig. To those components let 
us now turn our attention.
II. The insufficiency of reason
The positing of Quality as the a priori category has as its 
first consequence (or perhaps its first cause) the insufficiency of 
reason. In his dialogue with DeWeese, Phaedrus complains that 
analytical reason, dialectic reason, is often held to be the whole 
truth, but in fact does not prepare us to deal with the whole of 
our experience (p. 165). Dualistic, rational thinking will always 
get stuck (p. 277); indeed analysis can never deliver the whole
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